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The Suryengalagan affair of 1883 and its successors: Born leaders in changed times


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In 1883 a conspiracy was formed in the Yogyakarta kraton. Reporting on it after its suppression, the Dutch Resident wrote: "Both Javanese wars began in this way... Diponegoro acted in the same way in 1825... and today too such tactics are not without chance of success... fanaticism and superstition are still two powerful motors in Java". Though the year 1830 has for long provided a distinct historiographical watershed, after which we hear no more of the aristocracy whose actions seemed so dominant before that date, but only of the fiats and factions of colonial government, it is nevertheless worth considering the implications of this conspiracy, the "Suryengalagan affair", for the general question of aristocratic leadership. In a society where no middle class had emerged to lay claim to political preeminence, and no movement of intellectual renewal had as yet made itself widely felt, there was little challenge to traditional leadership; and it is interesting to note that though the Cilegon revolt — the only late-nineteenth century movement for which a detailed study is available — is characterized by the distinguished scholar who has analysed it as a "peasant" revolt, here too both the old nobility and the traditional religious elite of the region played a significant leadership role in a movement which harnessed a wide range of social grievances (Sartono 1966: chs. I-IV). The present paper attempts to draw from

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Ratu Kĕdaton, Consort
of the Late Sultan Hamĕngkubuwana V of Yogyakarta.
(Photograph, taken around 1865, from the KITLV collection.)

Ratu Kĕncana, First Wife
of Sultan Hamĕngkubuwana VII of Yogyakarta.
(Photograph, taken around 1865, from the KITLV collection.)
Suryengalaga’s curious history some conclusions on the Yogyakarta aristocracy’s significance both as an effective mobilizing force and as a symbolic focus of movements of protest, in the late nineteenth century and afterwards.

Background to the rebellion

Though it came to a head in the reign of Sultan Hamengkubuwana VII (1877-1921), the so-called “Suryengalagan affair” had its origins in developments of the two preceding reigns. The fifth sultan had died on 4 June 1855 without a male heir, but his consort, the Ratu Kedaton, was in a state of advanced pregnancy, and gave birth to a son, R. M. Muhammad, on 17 June (Politiek Verslag 1855). Senior princes at the court declared that according to Javanese adat posthumous sons were ineligible to succeed to the throne; and it was also suggested that the boy’s paternity was suspect. The Ratu Kedaton was alleged to have been unfaithful to her husband, probably with his younger brother, to whom indeed she had once been engaged. This younger brother was proclaimed sixth Sultan of Yogyakarta (1855-77) by the colonial government.

Though passed over in the succession to the throne, R. M. Muhammad, later invested with the princely title Pangeran Suryengalaga, became while still a child a focus for the hopes of those seeking to overthrow the present regime and inaugurate a juster reign. Already in 1864 a conspiracy in Klaten planning to abolish both the Surakarta and the Yogyakarta kratons and to establish a new kingdom at Prambanan nominated him as the Ratu Adil of the new order. But the prince was a weak vehicle for these hopes: it became clear that he was to a greater or lesser extent mentally deficient. Dutch sources consistently refer to him as simple-minded (onnozel), and van Baak, Resident of Yogyakarta at the time of the conspiracy, describes him as “fat and pappy, as the weak in mind often are, with a shuffling, shambling gait and bulging, expressionless eyes”. Despite this, his mother, perhaps encouraged by such signs as his early selection for the rôle of Ratu Adil by the Klaten rebels, continued to work for his advancement. She was disappointed when in 1872 the government proclaimed Suryengalaga’s cousin (or, if the rumours surrounding his parentage were true, actually his half-brother), son of the sixth Sultan, heir apparent. However, even after this cousin succeeded to the throne as Hamengkubuwana VII in 1877 she continued to intrigue on her son’s behalf, forming an alliance with another royal consort.

This was Hamengkubuwana VII’s first wife, the Ratu Kencana, who, having two daughters but no son, felt her position seriously threatened by the rising star of his second wife: she was said to be of a sweeter disposition, and had given the Sultan male children (BGG 1 March 1881 No. 4; Komm. 12 Feb. 1881 No. 74 Geheim).
In 1880, the Ratu Kedaton and the Ratu Kencana proposed a marriage between their respective offspring, envisaging that Suryengalaga would succeed to the throne, with one of the Ratu Kencana’s daughters as his consort, so that as the mother and mother-in-law of a weak-minded Sultan they would be in a strong position at court. The Ratu Kencana was under some financial pressure to strengthen her position, since she was extravagant and had accumulated debts running to thousands of guilders. The Ratu Kedaton, on the other hand, was motivated by pure ambition rather than by financial considerations, since, unlike most women of the court, she lent rather than borrowed money, and had both cash reserves and considerable amounts of gold and jewelry. This financial liquidity was certainly an important factor in enabling her to enlist a following for Suryengalaga later, when her attempts to manoeuvre towards her goal from within the court and governmental establishment failed. For the proposed marriage was disallowed by the Sultan, who did not wish to see his daughter given to the weak-minded Suryengalaga to further the Ratus’ plans, and personally arranged a different match for her. And on 5 March 1883, the ten-year-old son of his second wife was proclaimed heir apparent. The Ratu Kedaton must have begun to realize at this point that all official channels of promotion were now closed to her son, since in the course of the following month she was already engaged in planning to raise him to the throne by a rebellion.

Recruitment of support

Clearly, this plan required a minimum amount of support, and the Ratu Kedaton sought this from two different circles. Firstly, from among her blood and affinal relatives at court, of whom the most senior were her elder brother Tumenggung Sumadiningrat, and her son’s brother-in-law Tumenggung Gandakusuma, who was a son of the former Patih Danureja V and now held the high office of nayaka. It is clear from testimony given by several of those involved that the Ratu Kedaton had approached Sumadiningrat on about the 28th or 29th of March but had received no support from the Tumenggung, who strongly disapproved of any plan to defy the government. According to the Ratu Kedaton and Suryengalaga himself, an approach had also been made to Gandakusuma, but there is no mention of this in any of the other testimonies, and Gandakusuma subsequently played a prominent part in the pursuit of the band of conspirators. Other relatives, however, did agree to support Suryengalaga’s cause: two of Sumadiningrat’s own sons (thus the Ratu’s nephews and Suryengalaga’s maternal cousins) by name of Tarunaatmaja (also known as Bagong) and Suwindu; three of the Ratu’s younger brothers (Raden Mas Banteng, Raden Mas Sudigbyo and Raden Mas Mukaram); and a total of 9 other relatives, most of them blood kin. The most obvious
common denominator among these relatives is their youth: apart from three men in their 50s (one of whom was Suryengalaga’s father-in-law), the average age of the remaining 11 was 27-8 years.¹⁴ Eleven men and one woman from the _kraton_ not related to the Ratu or her son by blood or marriage were also involved, and these appear to have been ordinary court retainers and servants (_panakawans, kēbayans_ or messengers, and so on).¹⁵ Only one of them was a man with any claim to rank, a man bearing the (lower) aristocratic title of Raden, who was employed as a _lurah lampu_.¹⁶

Youth had also been a common bond among those who had joined the great rebellion of Dipanagara, one of whose principal commanders, Sēntōt, was only 19 years old when appointed. There was, however, a significant difference in the rank and influence of participants in the two rebellions, for whereas more than half of the princes of the court had joined Dipanagara (Carey 1976:75) no princes or influential office-holders came over to the Ratu Kēdaton and Suryengalaga. From the testimonies of those interrogated, it seems that those involved were (whether blood relatives or not) poor, and in a dependent relationship to the Ratu.¹⁷ The circumstance that the age of most of these followers was about the same as that of Suryengalaga himself (28) suggests the existence of a peer group of the type of servants-cum-playmates who surrounded Javanese princes from childhood to maturity.

Secondly, it is clear that the Ratu canvassed support from among those who could lend religious validation to her son’s cause. Three _hajis_ appear as somewhat shadowy figures in the testimony of those of Suryengalaga’s followers who were interrogated, though no information is given on the ideological motivation behind their support of Suryengalaga, or on the actual part they had played in planning the rebellion. It seems clear, however, that Suryengalaga’s followers could not have been a highly integrated group with a long-standing commitment to a common religious position. Those interrogated could only name one of the _hajis_ — Haji Istat, who had apparently been on the point of going to Mecca for the second time, but had been dissuaded by the Ratu.¹⁸ It appears that there was no _guru-murid_ relationship between the _hajis_ and the others involved, and that they were not drawn together by common membership of the same _tarekat_.¹⁹ They may, on the other hand, have hoped to capitalize on, or even have circulated, reports that Suryengalaga was endowed with supernatural powers: van Baak reported that such stories were going the rounds in Yogyakarta at the time of the rebellion.

Haji Istat himself is described by van Baak as a teacher of _ilmu kadigdayan_, the science of invulnerability, and a Babad from the Yogyakarta _kraton_ which gives an extensive account of the Suryengalagan affair elaborates on this, depicting him as a practitioner of black magic (_sihir_), handing out amulets containing _mantras_ or Arabic
inscriptions and muttering prayers. His followers are described as people of weak intelligence and character who credited him with the ability to confer magical protection and bring about victory in battle (LOr 6756:41-2). Though this account dismisses Haji Istat as a “village haji” and a superstitious old man (he was about 70 in 1883), van Baak reports that he had an ancestry which was distinguished in the central Javanese context: he was from the ‘priest village’ of Wanakrama and was in fact a descendant of the Pangerans of Kajoran.

The village of Wanakrama is situated near the Kali Opak, between Yogyakarta and Imagiri. It is an old-established pamutihan village — that is, a village set aside for pious Muslims for whom religion is a major organizing principle of village life. Wanakrama retained this character at least until 1960, when it was a stronghold of the Nahdatul Ulama, said to command the votes of 95% of the electorate.

The Kajoran line was one of the most important religious dynasties of Java. According to tradition it is descended from a younger brother of Ki Panđan Arang, later called Sunan Tembayat, whose grave, at Tembayat in the hills east of Yogyakarta, is one of the most important places of pilgrimage (ziarah) in Java today. The Kajoran family settled at Kajoran, a little to the north-west of Tembayat, and became allied by marriage to the royal houses of Pajang and Mataram. There was an element of tension in this relationship, since the authority of this and other religious dynasties was felt to be a real threat by rulers from “secular” dynasties. A formidable alliance between the head of the Kajoran line, usually known under the reverent title Paněmbahan Rama, and his son-in-law, the Madurese prince Trunajaya, conquered and burnt the capital of Mataram in 1677, and the dynasty was only restored by the intervention of Dutch armies. Paněmbahan Rama’s partisans in the interior of the country apparently included traders as well as men of religion, and are said to have had connections with Muslims in the trading towns of the north coast who resented the V.O.C.’s enforced monopoly in trade. The memory of the Paněmbahan’s spiritual leadership survived his death in the war, and adherents of his religious position — once again, they seem to have been mostly traders — remained active in the Tembayat-Wanasari area. Descendants and followers of the Paněmbahan were involved in other movements against rulers of the central Javanese state of Mataram allied with the V.O.C.: the Patih Nrangkusuma, who supported the Balinese condottiere Surapati against the V.O.C., was a descendant of the Kajoran family, and supporters of the movement from Wanasari (in the Gunung Kidul range) also joined forces with Surapati; and a later Pangeran of Kajoran was involved in the circle of gurus, hajis and “popes” which supported the Crown Prince (later...
Pakubuwana IV) of Surakarta on his collision course with the V.O.C. (see Kumar 1980 Part Two).

Haji Istat's descent from this family would therefore have been a particular asset to any movement against the status quo which enlisted his support. He was also connected by marriage with the Ratu Kědaton herself; and the Ratu was a niece of Dipanagara. Within the numerically small membership of the movement, therefore, were united two preeminent and characteristically "oppositional" lineages, one dating back to the myths of origin of the central Javanese dynasties and the other associated with the most recent and serious uprising, the Java War. It is in terms of these lineage traditions rather than of more generalized ideologies or of organisationally more 'modern' movements that the rebellion can best be understood.

The Course of the Rebellion

Haji Istat had been given a yellow payung (sunshade), symbol of kingship, to rally support to the cause, and shortly before their departure from Yogyakarta Pangeran Suryengalaga himself and five of his relatives swore an oath that if they did not make him ruler or die in the attempt they might no longer be regarded as people of the Prophet. From the testimony of Sumadipraja, the Ratu Kědaton's cousin and apparently her chief support, it appears that for a few weeks after the elevation of Raden Mas Kadiat as heir apparent on 5 March the Ratu had entertained the idea of sending a petition to the Resident asking him to withdraw this title and bestow it on her son instead. She decided not to go ahead with this plan, probably realising that the colonial government was unlikely to reverse a decision of this sort, publicly solemnised. In the next few days she committed herself, her son, and her followers to the step of leaving the kraton. In terms of old-established patterns of political behaviour, this signified rebellion.

The Ratu's immediate destination was the district of Rêmame in the regency of Magêlang. According to van Baak, part of this district had been the appanage of a son of the first Sultan of Yogyakarta named Pangeran Wiradiningrat, and a descendant of his had become the first Regent of Rêmame when the former mancanagara region of Kêdu was annexed by the British government in 1821. There seems, however, to have been no son of Hamêngkubuwana I by this name; the person concerned was probably R. T. Jayaningrat, a scion of an old Mataram Bupati family who married a daughter of the sultan and lived on lands in Rêmame (Carey 1981:289). The Regency of Rêmame was later absorbed into that of Magêlang but numerous descendants of this family, some of them village heads, continued to reside there, and the Ratu no doubt counted on their support on the basis of kinship.
The followers of the Ratu were probably informed of the plan to leave the kraton on Monday 2 April, a week before the date on which it was to be carried out. On Thursday 5 April, however, the Ratu Kêdaton's nephew Tarunaatmaja informed her that his father, the Ratu's elder brother Sumadiningrat, now knew of the plan and had severely reprimanded him for being party to such a scheme. When she heard this, the Ratu decided to put forward the departure and leave that same night, calculating that Sumadiningrat, if he disapproved of her move, would certainly inform the Resident. She attempted to stay his hand while she and her band made their escape by sending Tarunaatmaja back to him saying that she would come and discuss things on the morrow.

The Ratu was not aware that the Resident had already, on Tuesday 3rd April, received the news of her plans, through the Sultan and his Patih, Danurêja VI, to whom the information had come in the report of a police spy. Little credence was placed in this information when it was first received, for such a scheme was considered too rash and futile to be actually attempted. By Thursday afternoon, however, kraton and Resident were reasonably certain that the Ratu was really set on such a path. Even so it was thought preferable to let her go ahead with her plans and catch the conspirators in the act rather than take preventive measures, which might appear as official persecution of a helpless woman and her weak-minded son. Javanese headmen on the Yogyakarta-Magêlang road, and the Bupati of Sleman, Suryanagara, were therefore alerted. Later in the evening, a Dutch landowner, R. M. E. Raaff, came to the Resident to report that Sumadiningrat had come to see him in great agitation and told him of the Ratu's plan. That Sumadiningrat had chosen to turn to an estate owner rather than to the Resident is a reflection of the fact that the estate community, more or less permanent residents in the area, developed closer ties with the kraton than government officials could in their shorter terms of office. (Not a few of these officials, indeed, saw their mission as the protection of the minimal security of the peasantry against the combined rapacity of the aristocracy and the planters.)

Two women from the Ratu's residence also came to report that the Ratu and her son had left at eight o'clock, and that a band of followers armed with lances and pikes had also left in stealth and were to join up with mother and son on the Magêlang road. The Resident now decided to call in Dutch troops. The available European dragoons of the Sultan's bodyguard, 25 in number under the command of Lieutenant Kohn, were considered a strong enough force, acting in cooperation with the Bupatis and Tumênggungs and their men, to bring back the fugitives before they could reach the Kêdu boundary. Meanwhile the Ratu and her son, with two of his selirs, were travelling along the main road to Magêlang in hired carriages. When
The horses of these carriages tired, they managed to obtain post horses, and a carriage and driver, under pretext of going to visit Tumenggung Gandakusuma. They then forced the driver to go on in the direction of Kêdu, and joined up with their armed followers near the Kali Winanga.

The Bupati of Sleman, Suryanagara, intercepted the party but did not attempt to restrain them by force; and they were subsequently overtaken by Kohn’s dragoons. In the fight which ensued, the Pangeran’s party fled, leaving behind weapons and goods, including a flag with a pulley and rope, papers, and some gold and silver valuables. The dragoons suffered casualties, however — eight were wounded, of whom two subsequently died — probably because they had been armed only with sabres, against which the long pikes of Suryengalaga’s followers had a certain advantage.

When it was clear that the rebels had not been apprehended, the Resident decided the situation was more serious than had been thought, and despatched telegrams to the Governor-General, and to the Resident of Kêdu asking for his military cooperation. He sent out more troops, both Dutch and Javanese, along the Magelang road, and the Resident of Kêdu began moving his troops southward. Next day at noon, news was received that the Pangeran and a number of his followers were in the village of Balerante, in the southern foothills of Mt. Mêrañi; and at two o’clock, further news came that he had been taken into custody. The Resident of Kêdu now moved his troops back from the border in order that their presence should not alarm the Ratu and turn her back from crossing the Kali Krasak into his territory.

Next morning (7 April) he received news that the Ratu — a kraton lady nearing 50 — had indeed crossed the river, fording the steep banks; her son had been apprehended unsuccessfully attempting the same feat. She was now in the village of Sêmpon in the district of Rêmame, to the east of Salam, and had stipulated that she would surrender to no-one except the Resident himself. He went to meet the Ratu and she and three followers still with her surrendered and handed over their weapons. They were returned to Yogyakarta next day, under escort.

The rebellion was over. It remained only to round up those few of the band still at large and to decide on the appropriate legal measures. Haji Istat, however, eluded his pursuers for more than two weeks. He was finally cornered, and killed, allegedly resisting arrest. His son, Haji Umar, was found hiding with his wife in the wooded flanks of the Gunung Kidul range, but was later released from custody. One of those alleged to have killed a Dutch dragoon eluded capture until 1887, when he was arrested in Bagêlen, where he had set up as a guru “preaching fanaticism” (BGG 22 March 1887 no. 14). The rest of those involved, who had dispersed in various directions
through the surrounding countryside, were picked up within a few days.

On 8 April, van Baak telegraphed the Governor-General to ask whether the banishment of the Ratu and her son should be done in the name of the Government or in that of the Sultan. The Governor-General pointed out that if it was thought necessary to remove them with speed from the local scene, then the Sultan must decree their banishment. This he did on 11 April, allotting each of them 150 guilders a month for their maintenance from his revenues; and on 12 April, one week after their flight from the kraton, they were exiled to Menado. Eight other people — relatives, followers, wives and children — accompanied them, either voluntarily or because they had been exiled for their participation in the affair (MR 1883 no. 339). In June, the Raad van Nederlandsch Indië formally withdrew the rank of Major of the General Staff which it had conferred on Suryengalaga on 18 October 1879 (MR 1883 no. 526).

The interrogation of the remaining followers was held on 13 April. The three testimonies which have been preserved in the archives tell us little of the motivation of those involved, other than that they had sworn to undertake the task before them as "people of Allah", and that at least one of them had shaved his head to look like a haji. Shaving the head had also been a practice among the supporters of Dipanagara at an earlier period, apparently symbolizing commitment to war in the path of God (Carey 1981:254). What does emerge, however, is that though all three were relatives of the Ratu and therefore not without claims to high birth, they were nevertheless poor and in a dependent relationship. One, Sumadipraja, had been in service in the kraton kulon, the residence of the Ratu and Suryengalaga, for 20 years, and was paid four guilders a month. The others were also employed as retainers, and one of them had been advanced money to buy clothes and redeem his kris from the pawnshop as a prerequisite to his participation in the rebellion.

After this interrogation van Baak recommended that all those involved be exiled as political offenders. He pointed out that although some of them were liable to the death penalty under criminal law, it would be difficult to establish which of them were actually responsible for the death of the dragoons, and the ringleaders had already been sent into exile. His suggestion that they might become the pioneer settlers of an agricultural colony on Borneo, which he hoped might relieve the population pressure on Java, was not taken up, and those of noble rank were exiled to Banda with an allowance of five guilders a month from the Sultan's treasury. (It will be noted that Sumadipraja had actually earned himself a 25% wage increase by his participation in a rebellion.) Those of common birth were exiled to Benkulen where they could live by wage labour.
The "Suryengalagan Affair" of 1883

The Kraton View of the Rebellion

The rebellion and its suppression did not go uncelebrated in kraton circles: a Babad was written, describing the affair extensively. It is not a work in the severe and heroic style found in some 18th-century Babads. Rather, it evokes a busy but hardly heroic world of court politics under the "Gupermen" (the colonial government) in a language also busy and lively, with considerable use of direct speech, generally reported in the speech forms of the period rather than in the standardised literary usage often employed in Babads. It is clear that a great deal of information on the movements of those involved — in the rebellion itself as well as in its suppression — had come into the kraton via various channels, for the Babad records these in much greater detail than is found in the archival records. Little would be gained by including all this material here, but a few points may be noted. Where the Dutch reports centre on the steps taken by Dutch officials, the Babad records those taken by kraton officials. Though the pursuit of Suryengalaga and his associates is portrayed as a military operation in the heroic style, it is also made clear that senior members of the Sultan's administration went through considerable soul-searching as a result of deficiencies in their part of the operation, particularly Suryanagara's failure to apprehend the party (leading to the death of the Dutch dragoons), and to take the letters left behind into safe custody: they were found torn into pieces (LOr 6756:96-7). Some village officials suffered equal discomfiture, particularly the unfortunate Wedana of Remame, who was instructed by his Javanese superiors to tell the Ratu that her son and followers had returned to Yogyakarta and been granted a pardon. He found himself unable to tell a lie to a person of royal birth, and was angrily upbraided for his naive and countryfied inflexibility in choosing tactics to deal with an enemy of the state (LOr 6756:96-7). The pathetic state of Suryengalaga himself, speechless, embarrassed, and bereft of the "light" of royalty, is also described with some gusto (LOr 6756:81-3).

Although the major part of the Babad relates the details of the pursuit, something is said of the reaction in Yogyakarta when the rebellion became known: people bundled together provisions and bedding as they prepared to take shelter, wives tearfully farewelled husbands called up in the troop movements, some men trusted their strength and bravery to carry them through with honour, while others relied upon a variety of spells, young boys fancying that they had been gifted with invulnerability and the power to kill at a touch. A conversation between two citizens is also reported: the first asked his friend what he thought of the Pangeran's aspirations, and was told that, though they were legitimate enough, this was not the place and time, for glory and victory in battle now lay with the Dutch.
Moreover, there were no real grievances in Yogyakarta: the Dutch Government could not be faulted and was closely allied with the *kraton*, where the Crown Prince had just been appointed. And the people were only copulating lice. It would have been better for the Pangeran to have eschewed violence and chosen the gentler stratagem of sending a petition to Batavia. His friend retorted: you claim to be very clever and talk of composing nice letters, but have you forgotten that he is a king's son, and the Javanese are very tied to their customs and superstitions — even commoners have been able to attract a following in their rebellions, and how much more would a Prince? The other admitted that this was so, but after all, it was one thing to make a lot of noise and commotion: could any of them ultimately escape being caught like a fish in a trap?

The Babad also remarks briefly on an atmosphere of apprehension in Kêdu, where the *warungs* and *pasars* were for a while deserted, until the Resident encouraged the inhabitants to go about their daily business (LOr 6756:93). No mention is made however of even localized insurrection in support of Suryengalaga either in Yogyakarta or in the countryside.

A number of search parties were mounted to pick up Istat, and the Babad relates the vicissitudes of both the successful and the unsuccessful ones. Istat had not taken to flight until after a repeated search of his house in Wanakrama brought to light a number of *payungs*, the parasols which are the prerogatives of royalty and which were instantly recognized as proof of his complicity in the rebellion. His sons and grandsons fled with him, and they were pursued by another Haji of Wanakrama, Haji Usub, whose assistance had been recruited by *kraton* officers. Istat and his descendants fled up Mt. Pucung, but Haji Usub succeeded in persuading them to come down again by advising Istat to say that the Ratu had initiated the whole affair and he, Istat, had only obeyed royal direction. Subsequently, however, the behaviour of the *kraton* force under Tumenggung Gandakusuma's subordinates caused Istat's son Umar to become increasingly nervous, and he and his father again took flight, escaping into a cane field. Haji Usub upbraided the troop commander for his incompetence; the latter had his men search the field, but without success; and since it was necessary to wait for permission from Yogyakarta itself before burning the Dutch-owned cane, Istat and his son were nowhere to be found by the time this step was taken.

According to the Babad, they went next to Mt. Pajimatan, where the son took leave of his father and returned to his own family in the village of Kêding Poh, in the district of Playen, where he was arrested. Istat remained behind purifying his mind by reciting prayers and parts of the Kuran and by performing *dikir*.

Some of the prayers mentioned are well-known Muslim prayers.
such as the ayat kursi, and the Exordium of the Kuran. Others are spells rather than prayers and belong to the practice of sihir. The surahs which he is said to have recited are Ya Sin (no. 36), Nur (no. 24) and Saba’ (no. 34). The first, Ya Sin, is considered one of the central surahs of the Kuran, even indeed as the heart of the Kuran, and is appropriate to a variety of occasions: it is, for instance, an act of special merit to recite it on the eve of Friday. But in this context it is probably most appropriate to note that it is the surah which is recited for the dying, and deals with the subject of the resurrection of believers, a theme which is also found in the other two surahs mentioned. These surahs must have been chosen by the writer because of their particular relevance to the situation of Haji Istat, who had become a rebel and knew he now faced death at any hour.

Istat is said to have made his way to Karang Sëmut, on the Opak river south of Yogyakarta, and thence to [Këm]bang Arum, which is in the foothills of Mërapi. This is a distance of about 30 km. as the crow flies, and since he would obviously have taken a circuitous route avoiding Yogyakarta itself, the old Haji had now made a very considerable journey. He then went on to an unidentified place called “Lintang Sinipat”, intending to surrender to the high-ranking Javanese official — unnamed, probably a Bupati — in charge there; but this official refused to see him, merely sending a message through his servant Tambakwisa advising Istat to surrender for the sake of his descendants. Istat gave his lance, his kris, and 200 real to Tambakwisa, so that he might attain a state of spiritual composure, free of material impediments.

Istat returned now to his own village, where he spent one more day in the woods purifying himself for his final sacrifice. He went then to the house of one of his pupils, Kanapi, who was just then being interrogated by the police. When Kanapi’s son came to tell him of Istat’s arrival, Kanapi led the police and troops back to his house, and Istat was killed. The author of the Babad explains that his staff looked from a distance like a lance, and it was supposed that he was preparing to resist arrest. His dead body was subsequently abused by a kraton officer, arriving too late after an unsuccessful search to be in at the kill, and was then thrown into the river by the order of the Resident. Tambakwisa kept silence about the 200 real Istat had handed over to him.

The remaining pages of the Babad describe a royal marriage. Taken as a whole, it is not — in the opinion of this writer — a work of much distinction, either in style or in content. It describes what seem from a later perspective rather trivial details in turgid prose, and says very little about the ideological attitudes of any of those involved. Its author does concede to the Ratu and her son certain magico-religious powers, residing, for instance, in the Ratu’s weapons,
particularly in a fretwork chopper so powerful that a man could be
killed just by the wind of its stroke, and a *pusaka* kris, Kyai Setan-
kobër. When some of those who had taken part in the expedition
out of Yogyakarta were being interrogated, they were struck by a
sleeping-spell before they could reveal any information about the
prince and his mother (LOr 6756:62-3). Passing mention is made of
specifically Islamic elements, such as the cry of *Pèrang Sabil!* (Holy
War) made by a number of those involved, as they attacked the Dutch
troops (LOr 6756:57 and 124), and Istat’s sash, which was a piece
of curtain from the palace at Medina (LOr 6756:132). The principal
ideological tendency of the work, however, is revealed indirectly in
the descriptive material, which seems to centre about two poles. The
first is the court and its officers; the second the *santris* and *hajis* of
the villages.

The ruler himself, Sultan Hamèngkubuwana VII, is described in
grandiloquent Sanskritized language lauding his wisdom, hospitality,
beneficent calm, great fame, and the joy of his servants as they gather
around him enveloped by his sun-like radiance and fragrant smell
(LOr 6756:11-12). He is possessed of both *wahyu* and *nurbuwat.* The
*panditas,* *ulamas* and *mukmin* under royal patronage are
portrayed deep in worshipful meditation to bring about a state of
ritual purity in the kingdom, and praising the jewel-like one, nursemaid
of the world, the deputy of the Manifest God (LOr 6756:12). The
writer also records that the Sultan carried out the wish of his late
father by sending an embassy of five *ulama* to Mecca with the sum
of 2000 *real.* This took place in the Akbar year, considered an
especially auspicious time.

The prosperity and good order of the kingdom is described partly
in terms familiar from the prologues of *wayang lakons:* food and
clothes are cheap, empty villages become filled with people, and traders
are attracted from foreign lands, bringing their goods and becoming
rich in prosperous Yogyakarta. There is an abundance of all things,
society is well-ordered, justice prevails, and evil-doers either leave or
reform their ways. But stress is also laid on the close association
between the ruler and the Dutch Government, and on the beneficial
role of the latter in maintaining Yogyakarta’s prosperity: the Govern-
ment does not take but rains down wealth; compensation is provided
for those who suffer losses; education is provided for children (almost
all of whom can be seen carrying pens); the ignorant are instructed;
literature and other forms of cultivation flourish (LOr 6756:21 and
40). Thus the author provides legitimation for the ruling order in
terms of three systems: traditional Javanese ideas of a good ruler and
blooming kingdom; the mutual support between the ruler and the
Islamic establishment; and the firm alliance between the ruler and
the colonial government.
The "Suryengalagan Affair" of 1883

Since the narrative describes what was after all a military operation (however small in scale), the author makes full use of the opportunity of comparing the kraton officers to knights of the wayang purwa. The following lines are a description of one of those charged with responsibility for overall direction of the pursuit, Tumėnggung Gandakusuma.

Gandakusuma's breast was glowing, as if exploding with fire. His figure was tall and broad, essentially well-proportioned. He could appropriately be sketched like Suyudana, furious at heart and death-devising, flanked by all the Korawa of Ngastina going in procession to contest victory in battle. If he came forward to attack, it would be in character that the enemy be completely destroyed. The Tumėnggung had a great heart, he was steadfast and not to be moved, resourceful, with powers beyond those of ordinary men, and dedicated. Now presented with a difficult task, he did not flinch, but strove to face it, with courage as his capital. He was not troubled by danger: how should he be reluctant? Such was his magnanimous character that even when he was angry he appeared to be looking peacefully upon the world. His mind was sharp; he knew the stratagems of strength and of subtlety.68

The comparison chosen for Gandakusuma is Suyudana, the Korawa king of Ngastina, a major character of the wayang, known for his adherence to the satriya code of honour, though he is also vain and easily swayed by self-seeking advisers. In physical appearance he resembles Bima, the most powerful of the Panḍawa brothers, who kills Suyudana in single combat at the end of the great war between Panḍawa and Korawa, when Bima violates the code of war between knights.69 In the case of the other kraton officers represented in this way, figures chosen for comparison include Baladewa, another Korawa king, of a more ‘refined’ physical type than Suyudana, and Panḍawa such as Antarēja and Antasena, sons of Bima, as well as the gods Yama (god of death and hell) and Narada, a figure of great supernatural power though of grotesque appearance.70

The hajis however are likened to different archetypes. The following is a description of Haji Usub — who, it will be recalled, was in fact an ally of the kraton forces in the pursuit of Istat — recounting how Istat's son had nearly struck him with a lance while escaping.

... he spoke with studied elegance, mincing about as he related what had happened as he was almost stabbed with the lance, bragging and staring boldly, just like a scoundrel, extremely impertinent and unmannerly. He wore a red skull-cap in the Turkish manner, his sarung was too short, and his white trousers short and wide. As one might expect he had the sleeves of his worn jacket rolled up. He was somewhat to be compared to Raja Kewusnendar, but he had no kris.71
The characters suggested for comparison here are not from the world of *wayang purwa*, whose framework is provided by the *Mahābhārata* epic. They belong to the Menak, an Islamic epic recounting the exploits of Amir Hamzah (Ḥamza b. ʿAbd al-ʿUṯūlīb), uncle of Muhammad. These stories, though not always highly regarded by Muslims of educated taste, achieved a high degree of popularity in the Malayo-Indonesian world. The Javanese version seems to be derived immediately from the Malay one, and ultimately therefore from a Persian one, written probably in north India. The stories of the Menak are enacted in a different sort of *wayang* theatre, the *wayang golek*, which uses three-dimensional doll-puppets instead of the flat leather ones of the *wayang purwa*. The king called Kewusnendar and the king’s son Landahur of Sērandil are both characters who were initially opponents of Amir Hamzah but who after being defeated by him became champions of his army: Landahur was actually a giant.

The Babad author here suggests, however, that Haji Usub could not really measure up to these comparisons, but was rather more like Marmadi. ‘Marmadi’ is one of the *panakawan* of *wayang golek*, in duo with ‘Marmaya’. They are based on the Arabian characters ʿAmr b. Maḍikarib and ʿAmr b. Umayya al-Damrī, messenger of the Prophet, but have been transformed in the Javanese context to conform to the type of the *panakawan* of the *wayang purwa*, clownish serving-men whose pranks provide comic interludes for the audience. So it is not to one of the towering warriors of the Menak that Haji Usub is likened, but to a ludicrous camp-follower.

At other places the Babad author pauses in his narrative to denigrate the imputed characteristics of ‘village hajis’: their superstitious belief in miracles (LOr 6756:41-2); their ridiculous habit of giving the foot-kiss to the senior among them (LOr 6756:122); their inability to face a threat to their own life without shivering in the face of it (LOr 6756:127). At one point a *kraton* officer sneeringly remarks that if Istat is bent on making trouble, let him go and join the attack in Aceh (LOr 6756:110). At first sight the work seems therefore to be strongly anti-santri in its bias, but this is an oversimplification. It is rather an attempt to discredit the extra-court and non-official bearers of the Muslim tradition, by portraying them as coarse, credulous, superstitious rustics, fit for the role of clown but not of warrior. ‘Official’ Islam, on the other hand, enjoys royal patronage and plays a part in royal legitimation.

The treatment given to the rebellion by the Babad author is such as to demonstrate the thesis that those involved were people of little worth and had little chance of success. Yet the fact that it was written
at all is, conversely, an argument in support of van Baak’s assessment that the affair was a real and serious threat to the establishment: why otherwise should it require such extended literary treatment? Had the rebellion, so short-lived in the event, the greater potential that these assessments attribute to it?

The Significance of the Rebellion: Aristocratic Leadership in Changing Times

Van Baak’s comparison with the Java War immediately brings to mind the first and most obvious difference, that of leadership. Dipanagara had been a man of exceptionally forceful personality, philosophical cultivation and political experience, and had had a presence in circles far beyond the restricted coteries of the kraton. Suryengalaga had none of these qualities, and could have attracted no support by virtue of personal magnetism. While it is true that his serious deficiency of intellect would be discounted by those who saw him as by virtue of birth alone the recipient of the divine light of kingship — the wahyu or nurbuwat — it seems doubtful that his qualifications as a figurehead or rallying point would have compensated for a lack of effective leadership. The rebellion, hastily initiated, required immediate and energetic action by its instigators to develop wider support. Suryengalaga himself was incapable of such action, and it is doubtful whether his mother could have operated effectively outside the limited strategies of kraton intrigue. Even within this context, she had made the serious mistake of allowing her plans to be exposed to government spies. It does appear that word of the planned rebellion had been sent out to others whose support was expected, but before they could rally to the cause all the original group had been apprehended.

Van Baak himself remarked that the choice of Remame as the initial locus of rebellion was in military terms untenable, since it was so open to encirclement by troops moving in from Yogyakarta and Magelang. It may be that the rebels had counted on being able to withdraw to the mountains, where the terrain still made pursuit difficult: here Haji Istat, an old man, eluded a sizeable search operation for more than two weeks. They may also have hoped that deficiencies in communications between the authorities in Yogyakarta and Kedu residencies would hinder the coordination of troop movements. But, if this were so, they failed in the event to capitalize on these factors, and it seems evident that the rebellion started, as it were, on the wrong foot. Kraton and colonial authorities had prior knowledge of the plan, and acted effectively enough to make its end follow on the heels of its beginning. By comparison, the Cilegon revolt was better organized (utilizing the network of a tarekat, the Kadiriya) and more successful in capturing a wide range of current social grievances: resentment against the
financial burdens of the land-rent, capitation tax and trade taxes; resistance to official interference with religion and custom; outrage at the violation of women's honour perceived in the vaccination program; indignation at the superior and contemptuous attitude of government bureaucrats (Sartono 1966:279-80).

Could a movement from within the Yogyakarta aristocracy, given more competent direction, also have mobilized widespread popular discontent? There is little doubt that significant discontent existed: the people of the Vorstenlanden are characterized in official reports of the period as poorer and less law-abiding than other Javanese, and the penetration of Dutch private enterprise, represented by the plantations, into peasant life was clearly accompanied by a good deal of friction over the terms of the contract. The provisions of the 1857 Staatsblad which regulated the hiring of land had been frequently breached because of the absence of any penal provisions and because plantation managers, as has been noted, were long-term residents who often achieved greater influence than a government official, even of high rank, in his term of office. They could make independent representations to the Governor-General, and their economic links with the Javanese aristocracy gained them considerable informal and sometimes even illegal influence. In 1873, about four thousand peasants travelled to the capital to complain about two prevalent abuses: the excessive demands made by the plantation management on their labour, and the late return of their land.

In 1882, during van Baak's term as Resident, a new Staatsblad regulating land leasing was made law. A second wave of peasant protest arose shortly afterwards, this time on an even larger scale, sweeping the heart of the Residency 'like wildfire' as complainants came in throngs from the sugar and indigo plantations. Van Baak regarded this as a reaction to certain provisions of the new regulation, provisions which he considered reduced the inhabitants of the leased lands to the status of a proletariat to be hired or evicted at the convenience of the enterprises. He also claimed that the Residents of Yogyakarta and Surakarta had not been adequately consulted on the clauses concerned. Though he was, as a consequence of his submissions, subsequently instructed by the colonial government that any changes proposed to dampen the peasant unrest should be 'minor' ones, he eventually succeeded in obtaining for himself and his subordinates a discretionary power to regulate conditions for each enterprise separately. There was considerable tension in Yogyakarta while these individual agreements, regulating the rotation of crops and labour requirements, were drawn up by van Baak and his Controleur, but a compromise at least sufficiently acceptable to all parties to prevent further trouble was ultimately achieved.

Evidence of widespread resentment over racial or religious matters
is less easy to gather, but it would be surprising if none existed. What remains to be asked is whether the aristocracy could have effectively led a strong movement harnessing existing discontent. Though it should not be assumed that the aristocracy as a whole was passively resigned to its present position — a more or less steady stream of princes and men of rank had to be sent into exile during this reign — their situation made effective action difficult. The economic base of the aristocracy had been seriously reduced: even before the Java War, the lands under their control had been progressively diminished, and after it, the last great amputation of the remaining mancanagara lands in Kedu and Bagelen left an evergrowing aristocracy fiercely competing for what land remained. This situation was used by the colonial government as a means of rewarding political reliability and weakening the influence of those who seemed dangerously unconformable. The case of the ruler’s brother Mangkubumi is instructive. He was a much more formidable prince than Suryengalaga, important in affairs of state and a man of great ambition and considerable financial ability. Although he was pragmatic enough to make use of Europeans where their talents recommended them, he was known to hate them as a group, and to harbour others equally hostile to their presence. In 1890 it was observed that he had become the student of a teacher of the Shaṭṭāriyā tarekat named Kasan Bēsari, showing him an ‘idolatrous veneration’ even to the point of according him the much-remarked-upon foot-kiss. It was to Mangkubumi too that an agitational letter, from an anonymous resident of Semarang, was addressed. This letter reproached the Javanese houses of Surakarta and Yogyakarta for allowing themselves to become tools in the Dutch plan to undermine the practice of religion on Java; and urged Mangkubumi to remember that he was a descendant of the great Sultan Agung, to follow the example of the Acehnese, and to look at the condition of the people, everywhere in the deepest poverty and misery, oppressed by taxes, neither dead nor properly alive — a very different picture to that painted by the author of the Babad Suryengalagan. Mangkubumi’s association with suspect elements caused considerable concern, and the Resident considered it desirable to establish a counterpoise to the influence which the prince had acquired through his forceful personality and economic enterprise. He sought this in Pangeran Surya Mataram, Mangkubumi’s chief rival, who had only recently returned from an exile of seventeen years, and was living in the Patih’s compound in a style dictated by his reduced allowance but well below that required of the full brother of a Sultan. Van Baak now considered that he had been sufficiently chastised by his exile and lack of adequate means of support, and recommended to the Sultan that he be granted an appanage. This was done; at the same time Mangkubumi’s preceptor Kasan Bēsari was exiled to Menado.
Apart from allowing the colonial government to teach the utility of political reliability, the shortage of land had other consequences. It led to an increasingly ruthless exploitation of what lands remained by those of the aristocracy who had managed to establish a claim to some parcel of them. They could, as outlined above, sell their rights to the plantations, thereby giving up their role as immediate patron, or oppressor, of the peasantry; or they could attempt to increase the yield of the land in other ways. To take one example, the incumbent bēkēl—the agent of the appanage-holder under the traditional system—had by custom offered a gift, the bēkti, to his master. This custom was now transformed so that the bēkēl-ship was regularly farmed to the highest bidder. Since the bēkēl was then faced with the task of recovering his investment, the progressive effect on the resident peasantry was one of ever-increasing extortion.

The aristocracy’s influence was diminished not only by the difficulties of its economic situation, but also by a tendency towards increasing isolation. Though a north-coast Muslim still addressed his grievances to Mangkubumi because he was a descendant of Sultan Agung, despite the fact that Agung’s successors could no longer claim to rule his region of Java, such a link inevitably incurred official disapproval—to say the least—if it became known. Dutch policy strongly discouraged any link between the aristocracy of the principalities and what may be termed the intellectual leadership of rural Java, the kyais and hajis whose authority radiated from the rural pesantren rather than from the kraton. The portrayal by the author of the Babad Suryengalagan of rural hajis as uncouth and ridiculous and his denigration of their claims to leadership in favour of the alliance between the divinely-blessed ruler, the official religious and military establishment and the colonial government, is in keeping with official attitudes. Nor was the loss of contact with the traditional religious elite compensated by the opening of new intellectual horizons which might have allowed the aristocracy to address society as the spokesmen of reformism, whether religious or secular.

One would expect, therefore, that the aristocracy’s weakened economic position and increasing isolation would have seriously diminished its capacity to lead in both its objective and subjective dimensions: not only by severely limiting its resources and freedom of action, but also by making it as a class no longer a creditable rallying-point for discontent, implicated as it was in some of the worst abuses of the colonial situation. Considering the first dimension, it seems demonstrable that the aristocracy’s capacity to mobilize significant forces was indeed at its end. One long-term resident of Yogya-karta at this period (Groneman 1887) does claim that the aristocracy was widely involved in the kecu parties which were a source of concern to the colonial government. These were essentially raiding-
parties aimed at specific targets (more or less along the lines of bank robberies), without ideology or social program, and not based in fraternities like the old bandit communities, which had lived their entire life outside the confines of normal society. Though some men may have been involved in a number of raids, and some intermittent working partnerships were no doubt formed, each kecu party was essentially an ad-hoc affair. Even were there stronger evidence that the kecu parties were regularly organized or financed by the aristocracy, this phenomenon cannot be considered as a serious threat to the established order, though it may be indicative of the prevailing social conditions. Perhaps, indeed, there is something symbolic of the times in the story of Dipanagara's grandson, the half-blind Raden Ngabei Dipaatmaja, who was felled by a sabre blow when the kecu party he had joined was betrayed to the police, and subsequently nursed by a Dutch doctor back to life, a death sentence from the Sultan, and eventual pardon by grace of the colonial government (Groneman 1887:199).

Yet the second dimension — the subjective appeal of the aristocracy as a rallying-point for discontent — does not correspond with the first as closely as one might expect. Those with grievances continued to seek their righting not in the overthrow of the aristocracy as a whole, perceived as an exploitative class, but in the setting up of an alternative, a "rightful" ruler. Legitimist movements arose with fair frequency in this period and far into the twentieth century, not least around the figure of Suryengalaga himself.93

Later "Suryengalagan" movements
The first recurrence of his name was in the Jaspani conspiracy of 1888, a year characterized by a near-epidemic of conspiracies and outbreaks, of which the most serious was the Cilegon revolt.94 Jaspani had been resident in the Tulung Agung-Lodaya region and was arrested there in August 1888 along with some dozens of followers. The revelation of this conspiracy, following so closely upon the Cilegon murders of Europeans, created panic among the European community in east Java, especially those living on isolated plantations. Jaspani had attracted followers from numerous regions, including Banyumas, Cilacap, Bagelen, Kedu, Panaraga, Bangil, and Malang. The great majority, however, were from Surakarta and Yogyakarta. A Dutch resident of Yogyakarta at this period remarked upon the movement of many santris from his region to the numerous pesantrens of the Tulung Agung area, there to be infected with 'fanaticism'.95 Jaspani himself was from Surakarta, and planned to set up a new kingdom of which he would be ruler.96 His father-in-law however, Amat Mukiar, though himself a Bantenese, had apparently undertaken to restore Suryengalaga to the throne of Yogyakarta.97 The pro-Dutch
policy of the seventh Sultan opened up the possibility that any alternative pretender might attract significant support from those who had reason to dislike the colonial government: and it seems that some of the tension which reigned in east Java was also felt in Yogyakarta at the Garebeg celebrations that year. The movement was, however, broken up before any disturbance could take place, although at least one European suggested that it had been improperly hushed up either as a result of official carelessness, or worse, because of the deception carried out by native officials who were themselves implicated.  

In 1890, another conspiracy came to light. This was the so-called 'Dulmajid affair'. Its leaders were [Ab] dulmajid of Tegalrêja, Kêdu, SêtradiKRama, village head of Nulis (about 6 km. out of Yogyakarta), and their friend Kasanrêja, who were alleged to have planned an uprising timed to begin during the circumcision ceremony of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince. Followers were attracted by claims to magic powers and by prophecies: Dulmajid was supposed to be able to turn a frog into the magical cannon Nyai Sëtomi; the water of a well sunk in SêtradiKrama's yard was said to have extraordinary properties; and it was prophesied that the coming of the new kingdom would be preceded by an epidemic, that the sun would be invisible for 15 days, and that everyone who had not washed in the water of the well would die. The new kingdom would be ruled not by Abdulmajid himself, but by the Ratu Adil, who was alleged to be present in the form of a child now in the care of SêtradiKrama. The child was called Dulkurnen, but would change into Pangeran Suryengalaga. Dulmajid would be given the title and position of Pangeran Puger (in the Mataram system of rank the most senior of the ruler's brothers); SêtradiKrama would become Patih; and Kasanrêja the Pëngulu. Besides its supernatural elements, the plan appears to have included an attack on established status systems. At Dulmajid's slamëtans, priyayi were to sit on the floor and wong cilik on stools, a reversal of customary arrangements. Once again, nothing was actually done to realise this vision and the three leaders were simply exiled under the extraordinary powers of the Governor-General.  

There have also been at least two twentieth-century movements invoking Suryengalaga's name. The first was the Dietz affair of 1918. This movement exhibited the same characteristics as the Dulmajid affair, that is, the identification of the 'legitimate claimant' to the throne of Yogyakarta with the Ratu Adil, the prophesying of calamities before the establishment of the kingdom, and the claims made to healing and magical powers. Finally, half a century later in 1967, the self-proclaimed Erucakra from Loano was according to Professor Sartono (Sartono 1973:98 note 2) regarded as an incarnation of Suryengalaga.  

The newspaper accounts of this last affair represent it in quite
The “Suryengalagan Affair” of 1883

a different light. Four elements are stressed: the self-styled Pangengan’s consorting with PKI members (only one, Herman Pratikno, is actually named) and with foreign Chinese, from mainland China; his practice and preaching of free love (he also had a pregnant, Chinese concubine); his attack on religion, especially Islam and Christianity (by a pornographic pun on the Javanese name for Christ, for example); his assumption of a feudal life-style, and mercenary disposition. It is possible that the movement did have links with communism (both because, in the Javanese intellectual landscape, ‘traditional religion’ and ‘radical politics’ are not hermetically sealed and separate areas, and because, for circumstantial reasons, PKI members in the aftermath of the coup sought sanctuary from the continuing hunt by assuming other guises). Nevertheless, the newspapers’ inventory of New-Order taboos is too complete to be credible. It is hard to believe that infiltrators from communist China would find it either ideologically or tactically sound to ally themselves with an old-fashioned Javanese mystic given over to feudal luxury and sexual self-indulgence. The newspaper version of the affair is not sufficient grounds to discredit the testimony of Professor Sartono, who was in residence in Yogyakarta at the time. And so we must, it seems, allow Suryengalaga his century as perhaps the most evocative of princely figures for those hoping for the restoration of a just rule in Yogyakarta.

Clearly these later Suryengalagan affairs are quite different in character from that of 1883. They are not movements from within the court, but from outside it. Though the instigators invoke Suryengalaga’s name, their connections with the aristocracy are in fact tenuous: they are either outright pretenders, as apparently in the case of Dietz, or people whose claimed connection with the “rightful” ruler whose coming is foretold is not a real but a supernatural one, as was the case in the Dulmajid conspiracy. They provide evidence of a type of movement which has not been much remarked upon to date. Though, using Sartono’s categories (Sartono 1973), they can generally be described as “messianic” rather than anti-extortionist, revivalist or sectarian, and belonging to the Ratu Adil, the nativist, rather than the Mahdist, the Islamic, stream of messianism, they are a distinctive type of messianism. In at least four cases, Suryengalaga is the Ratu Adil, and it seems clear that there must have been a particularly strong central Javanese tradition in which the Ratu Adil was identified with the “rightful” heir to the Yogyakarta throne. The date at which this dynastic messianism developed is not clear: Dipanagara himself, though he took the title Erucakra, which is usually associated with the Ratu Adil, claims in his autobiography not to be the Ratu Adil but only to have received instructions from him (Kumar 1972:102-4). It is possible of course that many of his followers understood the situation differently, and that the identification of the rightful claimant with
the Ratu Adil was already established at this period. There is less
evidence of a similar tradition in other parts of Java,\textsuperscript{106} and in the
Cilegon affair it seems clear that the idea of an Islamic state had
gained ground at the expense of older, dynastic loyalties (Sartono 1966:
passim).

The other characteristic of the later Suryengalagan movements and
others like them which is immediately striking is their reliance on
supernatural assistance and their extreme voluntarism. That they were
so soon suppressed is not entirely to be attributed to the increasingly
effective control of the colonial government, but also to the wistful
and already-disarmed nature of the movements themselves. They seem
rarely to move beyond the tactics of prophecy, claims to supernatural
powers, and sometimes a joint pilgrimage to a location traditionally
associated with the coming of the Just King.\textsuperscript{107} These elements were
not absent from earlier uprisings — they are found in the Java War —
but seem now to have become dominant at the expense of the militant
element, which has withered away. The ruler who will save his people
has become part of a dream; the dream has become the faith of a
people for whom old forms of activism are no longer effective and
new forms are yet to be conceived.

Of all claimants to the throne of Yogyakarta, Suryengalaga must
surely have been the least able and talented; and yet we find his name
invoked as Ratu Adil so many times, from Klaten in 1864 to Loano
in 1967. In the real and the symbolic careers of this prince we can
see with unusual clarity how the symbolic function of the aristocracy
outlived its old capacity for effective political and military mobiliza-
tion. In these movements of disaffection against the existing order,
redress is sought not through an attack on a whole class perceived as
exploitative, but in rallying to an alternative claimant whose lineage
seems to mark him out as the inheritor of an old tradition of un-
compromising opposition to unpopular regimes.

Because of the peculiar conditions of Javanese society, this con-
ception of political action survived into a period where it could only
be ineffectual. As has already been noted, no middle class of substance
developed to take over the leadership role of the aristocracy; and the
western presence closed rather than opened the intellectual horizons
of Javanese society, providing no access to new conceptions of the
nature of politics and political strategies until a very late period.
Old ideas remained for long unchallenged, and were even further
elaborated, giving rise throughout the countryside to a luxuriant and
tangled growth that would later blunt the tools shaped by new con-
ceptions of social action.
The “Suryengalagan Affair” of 1883

NOTES

1 The Resident, J. van Baak, was referring to the rebellion of Mangkubumi, begun in 1746, which led to the partition of Mataram into the principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, and to the Java War. See his report in MR 1883 no. 339.

2 In general histories of Java or Indonesia, the period 1830-1900 is remarkable for the virtually complete absence of Javanese names, in contrast to earlier and later periods: see e.g. de Graaf 1949, or Stapel 1930.

3 The boudoir history of the Yogyakarta court, thinly disguised by the use of mythological place and personal names, was publicised in an article by J. Halkema (who wrote under the pseudonym “Joris Goethbloed”) in the Locomotief, 18 Jan. 1881 no. 14. This exposure in print of the content of Yogyakarta gossip was considered a serious breach of etiquette, and Halkema, whose own personal scandals may have increased official exasperation, was ordered to leave the Vorstenlanden (the central Javanese principalities Yogyakarta and Surakarta) (MR 1881 no. 250, 7 March).

4 See Komm. 20 July 1865 no. 12286; also Gerdessen 1871:206-10. On the Ratu Adil and Javanese messianic movements see below, p. 273.

5 Van Baak’s report in MR 1883 no. 339. Van Baak alleges that the Ratu Kėđaton had attempted to make her son a man by presenting him with beautiful young women in his mid-teens.

6 The Ratu Kėncana had (unusually) been permitted to enter European society in her youth, and is said to have assisted Halkema in the contentious Locomotief article (see above, note 3), which alleges that her husband had seriously mistreated her.

7 MR 1883 no. 339. When apprehended, the Ratu Kėđaton had 900 guilders on her person, and a number of i.o.u.s from different persons were found among her papers.

8 See MR 1883 no. 393, 12 March, for notification of the proclamation of R. M. Kadiat (otherwise Chadiat or Akadiat) as heir apparent.

9 This is the form in which his name is usually given, though he was entitled to the more aristocratic form Kusumadiningrat.

10 The nayaka were the eight members of the Patih’s advisory council. They were divided into two groups, the four wėdana jero and the four wėdana jaba.

11 See report of interview with Pangeran Suryengalaga, MR 1883 no. 339 (Afschrift La.B). A resident at the Yogyakarta kraton, the personal physician to the Sultan, claimed that Sumadiningrat was, at least at one time, a supporter of Suryengalaga’s cause. See Groneman 1891:221.

12 His role is described in detail in the Sėrat Babad Suryengalagan (LOr 6756), which describes the conspiracy in detail.

13 The names of these relatives were: Raden Mas Sumadilaga and R. M. Sumadipraja (sons of the late Pangeran Tėpasana, grandsons of the third sultan and cousins of the Ratu Kėđaton), R. M. Atmadilaga (Suryengalaga’s father-in-law and related to the Ratu Kėđaton both by blood and by marriage), R. M. Prawiramėrjaya (alias Purwaatmaja), Raden Kartarėja, Yudapura, Sasramurcita, Den Bagus Sudiman, and Raden Prawiraarja (related by marriage only).

14 The youngest was 22, the oldest 36.

15 This list of those involved, and the information on their kinship ties and positions at court, has been put together from the following sources: the report of Resident van Baak in MR 1883 no. 339; the testimonies of those interrogated — all relatives of the Ratu Kėđaton and Suryengalaga — in MR 1883 nos. 339 and 417; the list of those actually exiled in BGG
24 June 1883 no. 1. There are, however, discrepancies between these sources; some names are omitted from one or more lists, and the kinship relationships are differently stated. The testimony of one of those involved (R. M. Sumadipraja, MR 1883 no. 417) implies that two other younger brothers of the Ratu Kędaton (named Atmaarja and Atmadeksana) were involved in planning the rebellion, but they were not exiled, presumably because they did not take part in the exodus from the capital.

16 Lurah was used as a title for certain grades of panakawan at the kraton. Presumably a lurah lampu must have been responsible for care and maintenance of lamps.

17 See below p. 260.

18 See testimony of Sumadipraja, MR 1883 no. 417. One of the other two hajis was probably a Haji Durbrakim from Jejeran who was subsequently exiled for his part in the rebellion (see list of those recommended for banishment in MR 1883 no. 417). The village of Jejeran is situated only 2 km. south of Yogyakarta, and is listed as a pamutihan jurukunci village in an 1832 report, “Opgave van den Pengoeloe der landen aan Priesters afgestaan voor het onderhouden van graven”, in KITLV manuscript H 698 b. It had a grant of 2 jung of land made for the maintenance of its graves, those of Kyai Tumenggung Gajah, Raden Tumênggung Sumadiniringat and Raden Ayu Wirayawinata.

19 As was to be case in the Cilégon affair of 1888, see below p. 271.

20 Van Baak’s report, MR 1883 no. 339.

21 See “Opgave van den Pengoeloe . . .”, 1832, in KITLV manuscript H 698 b, where Wanakrama is listed among the pamutihan villages. Its grant of land was 3 jung. On the Nahdatul Ulama in Wanakrama, see Selosoemardjan, 1962:172.

22 On the Sunan of Têmbayat see Rinkes, 1911.

23 On the Kajoran family and Panêmaban Rama of Kajoran, see de Graaf 1940.

24 “Secular” is in fact a misleading term, since the house of Mataram and its successors did not promote a “secular” world-view in competition to the “sacral” appeal of the religious dynasties. Rather, its literati claimed that the house of Mataram had incorporated, by virtue of its blood line (through the above-mentioned marriage alliances) as well as by more mystical procedures, the spiritual powers of those dynasties. This is apparent in such works as the Šrēt Centini (see Pigeaud 1933).

25 A late tradition even attributes Surapati’s own parentage to Panêmaban Rama of Kajoran, one of many examples of a pronounced Javanese tendency to draw political alliances into a framework of kinship ties. See Kumar 1976:388-9.

26 See van Baak’s testimony in MR 1883 no. 417, where it is reported that R. M. Atmaarja, a younger brother of the Ratu Kędaton, was married to a daughter of Haji Istat, and that Haji Istat’s son Haji Umar was married to R. M. Atmaarja’s sister.

27 She was a daughter of Dipanagara’s younger brother Suryaingalaga, who had been Dipanagara’s Patih during the early part of the Java War but was subsequently dismissed for cowardice (communication from P. B. R. Carey).

28 Van Baak’s report, MR 1883 no. 417.

29 Testimony of Sudigbyo, MR 1883 no. 417.

30 Testimony of Sumadipraja in MR 1883 no. 417, Sumadipraja himself says that he had been charged with drawing up the verzoekschrift to the Resident, but the Ratu decided not to go ahead with its presentation.


32 Report of van Baak, MR 1883 no. 339. Some of those interrogated said
that their immediate destination was the house of a certain Jayengatmaja, but there is no information on his relationship with the Ratu; nor was he subsequently arrested. (MR 1883 no. 417.)

33 Testimony of Sumadipraja in MR 1883 no. 417. The date as reported there is Sénin Wage 14 Jumadilawal 1812 A.J., converted as 1 April 1883. Like many of the Javanese dates recorded in the archives, this is clearly wrong: 14 Jumadilawal 1812 A.J. was 23 March 1883 and was not Sénin Wage but Jumungah Wage. It is probably an error for Sénin Wage 24 Jumadilawal 1812 A.J., which is 2 April 1883, wrongly given here as 1 April. There seems to be an error of one in the conversion of most Javanese dates in this material.

34 Testimony of Sumadipraja, MR 1883 no. 417.

35 Van Baak's report in MR 1883 no. 417; Komm. 20 April 1883 no. 298, Geheim.

36 According to LOr 6756:43 the kraton received the information from a distant relative of the Sultan called Yudawilaga, who frequently visited the Ratu Kęgaton. See further Komm. 20 April 1883 no. 298, Geheim.

37 See ter Horst-de Boer 1904:119, and LOr 6756:65, where it is reported that Sumadiningrat's son threatened him with violence if he did not support Suryengalaga.

38 It is possible that these two women were actually sélirs of Pangeran Suryengalaga who had detached themselves from him, since, according to the testimony of one of his relatives, four sélirs were expected to be in the party leaving Yogyakarta but only two had arrived (testimony of Sudigbyo, MR 1883 no. 417).

39 The sélir had a status somewhere intermediate between concubine and (morganatic) wife. In traditional court society it had been customary to marry a sélir at least during the period between the first clear evidence of a pregnancy and the birth of the child. See further Veth 1875:356f and van den Berg 1887:64.

40 This toponym, which occurs in both the Dutch and Javanese accounts of the affair, does not appear to be listed in gazetteers. LOr 6756:68-9 however locates it just south of the Kali Krasak, in the foothills of Mt. Mèrapa.

41 He had deployed 125 troops: see his report in MR 1883 no. 339. Reading between the lines of both the Dutch and Javanese sources, it seems that there was a certain eagerness on the part of the different jurisdictions involved to claim for themselves the credit for prompt and conclusive action against a dangerous rebellion, and the Resident of Kęgù's readiness to let the Ratu go on into Kęgù should probably be seen in this light.

42 See van Baak's telegram to the Governor-General, dated 24 April, in MR 1883 no. 339 and his report in MR 1883 no. 417.

43 Van Baak's report in MR 1883 no. 339. See further below p. 262.

44 This seems curious. After the Java War, the colonial government had been determined to take justice and police matters in Yogyakarta firmly in hand and had set up a new court, the Regtbank voor Crimineele Zaken, presided over by the Resident, and with a number of Javanese office-holders as members, which superseded the Javanese Surambi and Pradata courts in their jurisdictions. The Sultan retained, however, his former judicial prerogatives with regard to those of royal blood — the Princes, their descendants, and more distant relatives. Cases involving those in this category were judged in the Kadipaten court. Banishment could still, however, have been decreed in the name of the colonial government by resort to the "exorbitant powers" of the Governor-General. It is hard to see why this should necessarily have taken longer than banishment by the Sultan. (On courts in the central Javanese principalities, see Rouffaer 1931:335ff.)
Pl. 1. Dvārapāla of Barabuḍur now in Bangkok (copyright Asian Art Archives, University of Michigan, Breezewood Foundation photograph).
BGG 18 April 1883 no. 24. Van Baak had suggested Menado since there
the Ratu would be "powerless" (since she would be unable to appeal to the
inhabitants on grounds of religion or dynastic loyalty).

Testimonies of Sudigbyo, Prawiraarja and Sumadipraja in MR 1883 no. 417.

LOr 6756, the Sûrat Babad Suryengalagan referred to above.

LOr 6756:88. A large number of spells is listed, ranging from spells to make
oneself invulnerable, invisible, or slippery as an eel, to spells intended to
make an enemy incapable of moving or speaking.

LOr 6756:89. The word used is wahyu, which from its original meaning of 'revelation' came to mean a mark (usually some manifestation of light) of
divine favour, and by colloquial devaluation the mark of worth, potency,
or simply luck.

Têngu laken bae iya: têngu, pubic lice, is used of men to conjure up an
image of meanness and powerlessness; the author implies that the people of
Yogyakarta are not the stuff of martial enterprise.

LOr 6756:86. The general point is elaborated by the use of other similes,
such as krupuk sizzled in oil.

Haji Usub is described as the second of three sons of Haji Ibrahim,
a mérăikan (person exempted from taxes and services) of Wanakrama
(LOr 6756:107).

Just west of Wanakrama: see end map in Louw and de Klerck 1908.

This is south-west of Mt. Pucung and west (and slightly south) of Imagiri.

See Louw and de Klerck 1908, end map, where it is marked as "Djematan".

This is near the source of the Kali Trambutan in the Gunung Kidul.

He was later released: see above p. 259.

The practice of ḏikir (Ar. dhikr) is a repetitive exercise intended to
strengthen mindfulness of God, commonly by reciting His name aloud or
silently. More elaborate formulae, sometimes combined with particular
breathing and other techniques, and group exercises, are also used.

The majestic "throne verse" (Āyat al-Kursî, ii 255), perhaps the most
frequently recited verse of the Kuran.

The cultivation of various forms of sihir (Ar. sihr, "magic", especially
methods of establishing relationships with spirits of one kind or another)
was widespread in the Indonesian pésantern communities, as it was else-
where in the Islamic world.


The real was a Spanish or Spanish-American silver coin which had been
the main currency in Java up to the early nineteenth century, but the word
is used here for the Dutch rijksdaalder (f. 2.50), roughly equivalent in value
to the real.

This whole episode as reported in the Babad is mysterious: "Lintang Sinipat"
looks like a literary allusion to some place normally known by another
name, and the fact that the high-ranking Javanese is not named suggests
that the author was making as near a reference as he dared to some well-
known person who had reason to fear being suspected of complicity in the
rebellion if he received Istat.

LOr 6756:101. This was the name of the kris of Pangeran Alit, who led
an attack on the kraton in the reign of Mangkurat I (see de Graaf 1961:29
and 31). I am indebted to Prof. M. C. Ricklefs for bringing this information
to my notice.

Both words are of Arabic derivation. The first meant originally 'revelation'
(from God) but in Javanese works has acquired a more physical conno-
tation, being conceived of as some manifestation of divine light (a star,
or ball of light) which descended to the person destined to be king (see
Moerntono 1963:56). Despite the Arabic origin of the word, one of the most
popular wayang lakons centres on the struggle of the Pandawas and Kurawas for the wahyu. The second term (nurbuwat) originally denoted the light of prophecy, attribute of the nabis (prophets), but came to be used by extension of kings.

65 Pandita (Skr. pandita) has been used since pre-Islamic times to denote those concerned with the cultivation of spiritual or religious qualities. The ulama are those learned in the Islamic religion, and mukmin the faithful (Muslims) in general.

66 On the real see note 61 above.

67 The 'great' pilgrimage (haj akbar) occurs when the ceremonies on the <Arafat plain (held on 9 Dhul-Hijjah) take place on a Friday (see Snouck Hurgronje 1924:314-5). The year in which this embassy was sent must have been the 1877 haj akbar. Akbar years were also especially favoured for prophecies and movements directed against infidel powers.


69 For a description of Suyudana, see Anderson 1965:20-1, and for a translation of a lakon in which he plays a role (under his alternative name, Duryudana) see Brandon 1970:269ff.

70 See Anderson 1965:14 (Baladewa) and 31 (Narada).

71 Lit., 'he had no gandar': the gandar is the wooden sheath, used here as a (metri causa) synonym for the kris itself.

72 ... pangucapira, wiraga ambêrgigih. Nuturakêng tingkahnya arsa tinumbak, meneteng amacicil, dasar gēcoł rada, kaduk nglunyat sêmb panorama, kētu abang kagok Turki, sarunge jigrang, saruwal kombor putih. Patut mingkis lêngênan kulambi ganas, sairip mimba kadi, mraja Kewusnendar, nanging tan antuk gandar, mempêr Landahur Sêrandil, kirange gagañ, mimba Marmadi kunêng. (LOr 6756:113.)

73 On the derivation of the Amir Hamzah stories in the Malayo-Indonesian world, see van Ronkel 1895:91-8, 165-6, 176, 184 and 245-51.

74 'Kewusnendar' is in the Malay version Keyus-nizeh-dar, king of Ujan (in the Javanese version, Yujana); Landahur (sometimes also Lamdahur in the Javanese version) is Lendehur and his kingdom is Serendib in Ceylon (van Ronkel 1895:120-1, 147, 225 and 232. For a summary of the Javanese Menak, see Vreede 1892:36-60).

75 On Marmadi and Marmaya, see Pigeaud 1950:235-50.

76 Jav. ngujung, to place one's face against a senior's foot or knee: the former conveys a greater respect.

77 See above note 64.

78 At least three kyais and hajis had been summoned to Yogyakarta to support Suryengalaga's cause, but by the time they arrived the leaders had been sent into exile. One of these men wrote an autobiographical account, LOr 6553 of the Leiden University Library collection (see Pigeaud 1968:393).

79 Van Baak's report in MR 1883 no. 339.

80 Some initial fumbling did occur and the loss of the dragoons was an unforeseen cost: see above p. 259.

81 See above p. 258.

82 In the Vorstenlanden, the plantations purchased from the aristocratic appanage-holders their political rights over the villages concerned. This
included a certain percentage of the labour of the peasantry. Sugar, the main crop involved, was grown in rotation with the peasant's main food crop, irrigated rice, and it frequently happened that the land was not returned to the peasant in time for him to grow this rice crop. To the end of the colonial period there was continuing peasant resentment, and sometimes violent action, against the plantations on the grounds of their excessive demands for labour and their failure to return land in good time. The circumstances of the Revolution gave peasant action against plantation cropping much freer rein (see Selosoemardjan 1962:271-84).

Van Baak took up his post in April 1878 and the land-lease regulation became law in October 1882. See van Baak's Memorie van Overgave in MR 1889 no. 363.

Central Java was the main area for indigo cultivation, and the conditions of labour for indigo made it the most unpopular of all the export crops.

See Van Baak, Memorie van Overgave, MR 1889 no. 363.

Kasan Bēsari was the hereditary name of the kyais of the famous pēsantren of Tēgalsari (Panaraga); so it is likely, though not noted in the Dutch sources, that this man was from the Tēgalsari line.

Sultan Agung's example is appealed to both because of his renown as the first major royal patron of Islam in central Java and because of his campaigns against the Dutch.

On Mangkubumi and the Kasan Bēsari affair, see MR 1890 nos. 213 and 245, and MR 1889 no. 363; further Komm. 7 March 1890 no. 168 Geheim.

For an indictment of the land system as it operated in Yogyakarta in the 1880s see Groneman 1887. See also Mulherin 1970:24.

They are reported annually in the Koloniaal Verslagen. For Yogyakarta, the number varied between three or four per annum to ten times that number.

But not only around him. The descendants of Dipanagara, for instance, were also the inspiration of such movements. See e.g. KV 1887:2.

On the reasons behind the heightened unrest of 1888 (which was the year wawu of the windu cycle and a year when the haj akbar — see above note 67 — was celebrated), see Sartono 1966:196 and 272.

Groneman 1891:71. The jungle around Lodaya had been for many decades a place of exile from Surakarta, and a spirit of opposition to the Surakarta establishment persisted there.

One of his accomplices in Surakarta was a certain Prawiradimeja, whose Regent father had won himself a great reputation for heroism in the Java War and had been among the last to surrender; and the Resident thought it possible that two of the princes had also been involved. These were Pangeran Suryabrata and Pangeran Adisurya, of whom the latter, a Mang-kunēgaran prince, was a nephew of the Ratu Kēncana of Yogyakarta (see MR 1888 no. 597). Jaspani was to take the messianic titles Sunan Eruca kra and Sultan Adil.

KV 1889:5 claims that Amat Mukiar had been in contact with the accomplices (handlangers) of Suryengalaga. The archival sources (Vb. 21 Nov. 1888 no. 10/2079 and MR 1888 no. 597) do not provide any further information on the nature of this association, other than the fact that one Surakarta prince suspected of involvement was a nephew of the Ratu Kēncana (see note 96 above). He may have been drawn into the Suryengalagan party through this connection.

Groneman 1891:72-7. This writer frequently complains, however, about official lenience to evildoers, an allegation not supported by the evidence
of official records. On the Jaspani conspiracy see also Sartono 1966:269-71. (The name of the leader is given here in the less accurate form of Jasmani.) It should also be noted that Suryengalaga appears in this affair as ‘Gusti Mohammad’, his name as a child prior to his elevation to the rank of Pangeran. This name seems to have been the one most commonly used in the movements described here.

99 Dulkarnen (Ar. Dhu'l-Karnayn, ‘two-horned’) is a cognomen of Alexander (Iskandar) in the Muslim tradition. He is sometimes coupled with Solomon as the very type of a good ruler. See Drewes 1925:167.

100 It was considered unwise to run the risk of acquittal under ordinary legal process. On the Dulmajid affair, see BGG 10 May 1890 no. 26.

101 This movement is described in Sartono 1973:98-100. Dietz apparently claimed that he was Suryengalaga and had been adopted, in Menado, by a retired Dutch health officer, Major Dietz. At other times it was said that he was a reincarnation of Suryengalaga. His actual origins are not clear to me from Sartono’s account, but he was certainly an unusually well-to-do farmer and was able to set up his own kraton, a large compound containing the houses of his family and following. He apparently attracted some followers from the aristocracy of Yogyakarta as well as a large number of commoners: on one occasion he was welcomed by a crowd of 2000. These followers came from a wider geographical area (Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Kedu, and Semarang) than was common in messianic movements. There appear, however, to have been no economic grievances expressed and no social change projected.

102 This is the modern toponym. The older form was Lowanu.

103 Newspapers read are the Yogyakarta papers Kedaulatan Rakjat (15 April 1967) and Suluh Marhaen (15 and 17 April 1967), the Jakarta Kompas (15 April 1967) and the Surabaya Suara Rakjat (18 April 1967). The army had moved in on the Loano group (in the village of Sejiwan) on 11 April and arrested 112 people without loss of life.

104 The weightiness of the “communist” charge is obvious, and it should be noted that the affair occurred hard on the heels of the better-known Mbah Suro affair (in Blitar), which ended in the massacre of a mystical group apparently harbouring communists, and at a time of a general army crackdown on both suspect mystical groups and on the Chinese community. Sexual indulgence was a very noticeable feature of the accusations made against the Old Order; and “feudalism” was deplored under both the Old and the New Orders (though more under the former).

105 The subject of Javanese messianism in general is too large to discuss here. An account of some of the elements involved — Hindu yuga cycles, the figure of Maitreya in Buddhist cosmology, the Mahdist tradition and native ideas — is found in Drewes 1925:138-68 and Berg 1969:151 and 399 (e.g.).

106 Drewes however reports a west Javanese version of the Ratu Adil prophecy in which, though the Ratu Adil’s paternal ancestry stretches back to Muhammad, his maternal ancestry stems from the Pajajaran royal house. See Drewes 1925:170-1.

107 Such as Kediri, or Kétangga (in Madiun).
ABBREVIATIONS

a) Archival material and official publications:

BGG Besluiten Gouverneur-Generaal
Komm. Kommissoriaal
MR Mailrapport
Vb. Verbaal

(All from the Schaarsbergen archive, now transferred to the new Rijksarchief building, Den Haag.)

KV Koloniaal Verslag (report prepared annually by the Minister van Koloniën, and presented to the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 's-Gravenhage).

b) Manuscripts:

LÖr 6553 Untitled journal of the travels of Somarėja alias Mas Rahmat, in the Oriental collection of the Leiden University Library. See Pigeaud 1968:393.


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283

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