In 1957, an anthropologist with a special interest in the social, economic and religious organization of peasant groups chose the Javanese village as one of two examples typifying the 'closed corporate peasant community' - that is, of a territorial community characterized by 'localocentrism' to the point where it must be regarded as a separate 'socio-cultural universe' socially and culturally isolated from other communities and from the larger society. Such a community has a pronounced tendency to exclude not only outsiders (who threaten its straitened economic resources, especially resources in land) but also outside goods and ideas; and a complementary tendency to limit the ability of its own members to communicate with the larger society of which they are, in some sense, a part (Wolf 1957, especially pp.2-5). Yet only a little over half a century earlier a colonial official compiling a systematic description of Javanese village communities, which he would have liked to see as well-defined legal entities infused with a strong spirit of community and of self-regulation, commented upon the to European eyes extraordinary ease with which their inhabitants in practice 'broke the communal bond': even comparatively substantial farmers might abandon their land-holdings and leave, with or without their families, sometimes for no apparent reason and with no definite expectation of moving into a more advantageous situation elsewhere (van den Berg 1901, pp.129-30). The first writer - who despite the date of writing draws his material to a large extent from secondary accounts of the colonial situation in the 1920s and 1930s - draws a picture of the Javanese peasant as living in a tightly-knit village in a state of extreme fixity; the second, whose own personal experience of Javanese society also goes back two decades, in this case into the nineteenth century, sees these same peasants' grandparents or more distant ancestors as part of a much more loosely-knit population community in a state of considerable flux. It may be doubted (though the question will be left to other contributors) that Javanese villagers ever became quite so 'localocentric' as Wolf asserts; yet it is undeniable that during the course of the nineteenth century powerful and dominant forces worked in this direction. It is the intention of this paper to look at the way these forces acted upon Javanese society as it had been till then.

The sources available to those interested in developments within rural communities are far from abundant. If the village is a comparatively inaccessible sphere for historians of pre-modern European societies, it is far more so for a society in which literacy came so late, and to so few, among the peasantry. We never hear a villager speak of his own experience. Because of the peculiar characteristics of Javanese colonial society, we even lack the testimonies of those who, though from a more elevated background and perhaps even hostile to many characteristics of peasant life, are nevertheless in some sense members of the same society and culture and who
have lived among peasants - schoolmasters and priests are obvious examples from the European context. This great paucity of internal sources has meant that most descriptions of the Javanese village have treated the different communities involved in a purely systematic manner, describing how the village fitted into the social and economic hierarchies devised by the ruling classes, whether native or colonizing. This approach has perceptible limitations. Though there is no question that there was indeed an increasing correspondence between government fiat and local application as the colonial period wore on, still it was not a perfect one; and since, as we shall see, the colonial government dealt with the village largely as a unit, and official policy was not to interfere in its internal affairs official reports and statistics give little information on the social and economic effect of government directives within the sphere of the village itself. For any period earlier than the nineteenth century, this approach is still less reliable, since we must deal with a society characterized by very great regional variation in a context of pervasive political turmoil, so that generalized formulations of the institutions of the village and of its place in society cannot be more than theoretical.

This paper begins by adopting a rather different approach, emphasizing not so much the system, as the situation in which the village found itself - looking, that is, at the larger political context within which the village was placed, and attempting to infer what effect developments there must have had on the nature of the village itself. In order not to set the focus so widely as to eliminate all significant detail, let us look, if not at the flow of events pressing on one village (that would hardly be possible, with the available documentation), at least at the history of one region, the valley of Panaraga. This region has been chosen because, though it cannot be described as 'typical' - regional variation was too great for any one region to be that - it was always one of the largest and most productive of the constituent regions of the Javanese kingdoms; it was never itself the seat of government of an important kingdom; and its geographical situation was not such as to give rise to the growth of major towns based on trade. It might thus be described as a rural, agricultural area par excellence.

RURAL REGION AND ROYAL HOUSE (SEVENTEENTH TO EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURIES)

The region enters history quite early: there is a fair sprinkling of inscriptions covering the period from the early tenth to late fifteenth century. We know at least that a number of royal grants were made on behalf of religious communities both Buddhist and Hindu (Adam 1938 pp.107-20) and also that the region was ruled by its own princely or ducal house. It was, however, conquered by the famous Airlangga in the 1030s after an eight-year campaign, the last piece of territory to be absorbed into Airlangga's east Javanese kingdom. It was known, with Madiun, as the region of Wengker (van Stein Callenfels 1918, pp.74-84). Under the later and longer-lived east Javanese kingdom of Majapahit (late thirteenth to the first half of the fifteenth century) this region became the apanage of princes of the royal family and a community of Buddhist monks was endowed with a royal grant of tax-free land. With the decline
of Majapait there was a resurgence of local autonomy, but even then the region did not develop in isolation. The introduction of Islam is attributed to Batara Katong (Divine Prince), said to be descended from the royal house of Majapait, and to his associate Kyai Ageng Mirah, later his pengulu, and ancestor both of those who were to be hereditary lords of the region and of the most prominent families of kyai (heads of Islamic religious and educational foundations). A close link between governmental and religious authority was thus formed and is reflected in the description which a later Javanese author gives of one of the ruling lords of the region:

He was strong in government, quick in intelligence, deep in understanding, charitable to the poor and those who renounce worldly possessions. He freed ulama [those learned in Islamic law] from tribute and labour; he saw that the commands of religion were observed, in respect to the religion of the Prophet, so that understanding of the Law multiplied. (Soeradipoera et al. 1915, p.54).

The Panaraga nobility, descended from Batara Katong and Kyai Ageng Mirah, was related to other dynasties whose founders had played a prominent role in the spiritual and temporal establishment of Islam on Java - in particular, to those stemming from the two wali Sunan Giri and Sunan Tembaya.

Where it had once been attached to east Javanese kingdoms, Panaraga was later drawn into the sphere of the south central Javanese kingdom of Mataram (early seventeenth century onwards). Men from the region and from neighbouring Madiun fought in the campaigns of Sultan Agung (1613-45) in both east and west Java. Mataram was unable, however, to establish a stable and enduring regional administration, rent as it was from the late seventeenth century by rival claims to the throne. Panaraga was drawn into the ensuing warfare, and at the end of the major rebellion of the 1670s a population count revealed the effect of this involvement: whereas both Panaraga and Madiun were usually accounted at 12,000 ocaah (a ocaah being the landholder and his household conceived as a unit of agricultural production), Panaraga after the rebellion had been reduced to 5000 ocaah, and Madiun to a mere 2000 (Adam 1939, p.29). For a time, Panaraga was drawn into the independent principality set up by the slave-prince Surapati and seems to have prospered during these decades, for in 1709, when it was returned to Mataram by the Dutch, the number of ocaah had once more climbed to 12,000. It is interesting to note that at the conference which took place at this time to reorganize the restored kingdom, Panaraga was now, with Madiun and twelve other regions, declared to be directly under the Sunan, instead of being under the jurisdiction of one of the powerful coastal kupat (de Jonge 1875, p.cx and p.362). As we shall see, this is not the only indication of the region's links with the north coast.

In 1742, the reigning Sultan of Mataram was driven from his capital by a pro-Chinese and anti-Dutch party during the so-called 'Chinese War'. He fled to Panaraga and found refuge there. According to legend, he happened
to hear the dikin¹ recited by a pious subject who, being interrogated, said that he was both a farmer and a teacher of santri (students of Islam); and that he prayed for the ruler every day. Whatever the actual circumstances of their meeting, the ruler, Pakubuwana II, did indeed reward this kyai, Kasan Besari, when he was restored to his throne. Kasan Besari and his descendants were invested as the heads of the free village of Tegalsari—free, that is, of the obligation to supply produce and labour which rested on other agricultural communities. The pesantren (school for santri) of Tegalsari was to become one of the most famous on Java and to maintain its links with Mataram and its successor states for more than 200 years.²

Pakubuwana II's troubles were not over, however. He soon faced a major rebellion led by his nephew Mas Said (later Mangkunegara) and his brother Mangkubumi, which was to result in the partition of Mataram. Panaraga was a major theatre of this long and devastating warfare in its later years. In 1752, Mangkunegara forced his way from the west through a little-known pass in the difficult Mount Lawu terrain and conquered both Panaraga and Madiun; and the subsequent fall of the two richest regions of the kingdom caused much consternation to the Dutch Company. Panaraga itself (town and region bore the same name) was sacked and burnt, and new governors were installed by Mangkunegara.

At the end of the war, Mataram was divided into two principalities, Surakarta and Yogyakarta. In the complex division of the territories which had been part of the kingdom before its division, Panaraga was allocated to Surakarta (and neighbouring Madiun to Yogyakarta).

But what does this turgid picture of dynastic strife reveal to us of the tenor of village life? More perhaps than is immediately apparent. It shows how the leading families of the region were both deeply rooted in local historical tradition and intricately linked to other prominent families elsewhere in Java, and might be drawn into the sphere of influence of other centres (not 'the centre') or into supporting one of the contending factions there. Warfare brought into the region armies which ravaged and burned, some of whom, foreign mercenary troops like the Macassarese and Balinese, did not return home when the war was officially ended but remained to live off the land; and drew the men of the region out to fight under their leaders in other parts of Java. The extent to which partisan adherence to this or that dynastic faction had penetrated the very fabric of village life is reflected in the fact that though the different regions were officially divided between Surakarta and Yogyakarta, local leaders did not always accept their official allocation and moved to change sides, leading to a situation of endemic village warfare (perang desa) which according to one researcher persisted until 1830 (Ongkoham 1975, p. 88). Conflict also dramatically affected population numbers, which might be reduced by half, or even more. Though the destructive effects of involvement in the affairs of kings and princes are more obvious there was also a nurturing aspect of this relationship. It was the patronage of the Mataram dynasty which supported cultural institutions, particularly the pesantren schools of the region, physically located in villages, which played a very significant role in developing both local pride and an identity which was more than merely local, and whose leadership was widely valued.
Not all of Panaraga's contacts with the wider world were with dynastic politics, warfare and patronage. A Dutch East-India Company official wrote in 1784 after eighteen years in Surabaya that the Company's trade in these parts had never been of any significance, but that private trade (in ginger, opium, Chinese goods, etc.) had once been very extensive, travelling up-river 'even as far as Panaraga', though it had now declined because of the increased number and heavier levies of the tolls, and because the Chinese toll farmers were now obtaining goods from Surakarta and Yogyakarta and forcing them upon the Javanese merchants (de Jorque 1884, p. 62). Scholars have often seen Java as falling into a natural division, into the 'Islamic, trade-oriented' coastal area (the pasarir), and the interior, the location of the agrarian kingdoms with their Indianized-cum-nativist inheritance; but it seems that this division may have been overstated, both in its economic and its cultural dimension. The important coastal centres were located on or close to major rivers, whose valleys provided natural avenues for travellers. Panaraga probably had better contacts with the Surabaya-Giri-Gresik area than it did with the 'neighbouring' region of Kadawang, to which access was actually very restricted because of the difficult terrain, though roads existed. It may be more in accordance with reality to conceive of pre-modern Java as divided into slices, each centring on a river valley, rather than into coast and interior.

It is interesting to note that a Javanese text dating from the early nineteenth century but containing material from an earlier period already notes a distinctive Panaraga personality (Pigeaud 1933, p. 54) - a personality which colonial administrators of a later date were to describe, with a mixture of grudging respect and lofty disapprobation, as characterized by independence and self-confidence - praiseworthy qualities - but also by roughness, impudence, pride, hot temper and a lack of attachment to the domestic foyer; not to mention an excessive incidence of homosexuality (Adam 1938, p. 288). The persistence of such disorderly traits even after a century of colonial labour in the cause of orderliness suggests that we may have to revise our stereotype of the Javanese peasant as a meek toiler in the rice-fields reluctantly carried off to fight out of a subservient reverence for his lord; some peasants at least must have embraced a free-booting way of life not unwillingly, and had rather a different kind of relationship with their leaders.

Like many rural regions, Panaraga had its own cultural and art forms, of which the most spectacular in this case is probably the reyog, a dance-drama already established as a specialty of the area by the eighteenth century. It is a performance of considerable eroticism and pageantry, in which the dramatic high points are provided by a magnificent barong (peacock, lion, and tiger, lord of the jungle) and by the performances of hobby-horse dancers. These dancers have traditionally - and at least till very recent times - come from the so-called warok troupes, tightly-knit groups consisting of a strong adult warok and a number of young jatil, boys attractive enough to play transvestite roles. In earlier times the warok troupes had specialized in an explicitly transvestite dance known as the gambelakan, which was banned by the colonial authorities on account of the immoral and disorderly behaviour it was said to occasion. As in other
peasant societies, transvestite performances were popular for weddings because of their connotations of fertility. The reyog looks the very type of purely peasant fertility dance (as the hobby dances in England), but even here there is evidence of a continuing exchange with the court milieu: court circles sometimes produced their own — needless to say more refined (alus) — version of reyog (Kartomi 1976, p.112 ff.) and it seems that the original 'text' of the reyog performance may be found in the Panji episodic romance, which celebrates the refinements, langours, and ritualized valuation of court life. The warok troupes themselves are only one example of a number of itinerant, extra-local groups which were a feature of Javanese society through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which will be reviewed below.

To sum up, a survey of the history of this region has revealed the following developments to be important ones for an understanding of the state of its peasantry in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: a high degree of partisan, factional involvement in dynastic warfare, with peasants following their locally-based leaders in armed pursuit of their extra-local alliances, resulting in dramatic population fluctuations corresponding to periods of major turbulence, and weakness and lack of continuity in the institutional forms of society; yet at the same time a measure of cultural continuity, leading to the development of a recognizable regional culture centring around a particular type of old-fashioned Islam and distinctively local cultural forms. Not all rural regions underwent precisely these developments. The extreme east of Java, for example, emerged from the ferocious wars which devastated this area in the second half of the eighteenth century with neither institutional nor cultural continuity: its former population was dead or fled, leaving a desolate wilderness which was to be reclaimed to human habitation in large part by the Madurese immigration of the nineteenth century, an influx grimly but unsuccessfully resisted by members of the old aristocracy who retained bureaucratic position. At the same time, conversion to Islam was suddenly forced on the region by the Dutch, in a curious reversal of their general policy of containing that religion, in order to break the ties the old Hinduized principalities had had with Bali. Reviewing the situation over the whole of Java, however, it seems that the fact that the Dutch did not possess the military strength to impose their will directly had if anything regrettably consequent for the development of native society: for the Company was forced to pursue its objectives by forming alliances with one or other of the competing factions struggling to control the kingdom. This compounded the effects of aristocratic disunity, and the resultant warfare entailed a more prolonged disorganization and debilitating of regional society than was the case where the transition to colonial rule was relatively swift, as in Burma or Vietnam.

Though, surprisingly enough, Panaraga seems not to have been much affected by the last major war to originate from the aristocracy (the 'Java War', 1825-30), it was nevertheless annexed by the colonial government in 1830 together with a number of other regions which had formerly been governed by the successor states to Mataram. From the time the colonial government began to plan the administrative reforms it would introduce in the region, Panaraga begins to be described in more detail in official reports. These do not tell us everything we would like to know,
especially about developments in the village, but nevertheless give some interesting information about the administration of the region when it was still part of a Javanese principality. It was found that the situation lacked tidiness. The lands of the region now annexed to direct rule had been assigned to a number of different jurisdictions, which are listed below:

(i) Kabupaten (regencies), under a bupati (regent).

(ii) The narasuwita or sentana lands, which the ruler allocated to the upkeep of members of the royal family and more distant relatives living at court.

(iii) The pangrembe land, similarly allocated on behalf of persons of high rank actually living on it.

(iv) Perdikan grants, for those engaged in providing religious education.

(v) Kanoang grants, for the maintenance of specially revered graves ([Louw and] de Klerk 1909, p.170).

The bupati (known to the Dutch as the 'regents') performed a key function both under the old and under the later colonial system of administration. In the political systems constructed at the centre, they held office by virtue of appointment by the ruler, and sometimes a trusted official of the ruler might be sent out from the centre to enjoy the fruits of such an office. Very often, however, they were members of the dominant local family, allies rather than appointees of a ruler. This was particularly common in regions like Banyumas, Surabaya, and Panaraga itself where certain bupati dynasties had established a very strong position. It seems that the partition of Mataram had led to a marked increase in the number of bupati appointed in the regions, which now had to support first two, then three, and then four courts instead of one, and in a smaller proportion of the island's total area. The Dutch found that Madura had seven bupati in 1826, where in 1812 there had been only one; Panaraga also had six bupati now (Louw 1894, p.10 and [Louw and] de Klerk 1909, p.169). It should be noted - and this tells us something of the nature of the authority of the pre-colonial bupati - that the villages under the authority of each bupati were not grouped together in one block but were scattered about, lying cheek by jowl with villages which belonged to a different bupati's jurisdiction. Apanage lands were also fragmented into a number of separate parcels of cacah. Rulers granted apanage lands not only to their relatives, but also to those who served them, many of whom - and almost certainly the most generously rewarded group - would have been commanders and subordinate officers of their armed forces.

We find, in other words, a variable mix of local and central interests among those who were confirmed in the right to draw a certain amount of produce and labour from a certain number of cacah, cacah which may have fallen within recognizable village boundaries, but need not have done so. One important circumstance which allowed the court to make provision for apparently increasing numbers of its own appointees without actually displacing local potentates was the ready availability of new land for clearing. In times of peace, when the rural population, though indeed
thinly spread by later standards, was at least not killed in large numbers or driven out of an area which could no longer offer them subsistence, this land could be brought under cultivation. It is possible that a man coming from the capital, if he had been an important military leader, might bring his own men to do this. This personal bond between lord and follower, not tied to a long-established tenure of a particular parcel of land as in well-developed feudal systems, is behind the intricate interweaving of jurisdictions which, as noted above, the Dutch found in Panaraga, and which they were to attack. It is worth remarking in conclusion that Hoadley's study of Javanese law in Cirebon provides striking evidence from a quite different region and at an earlier period (the first decades of the eighteenth century) that these personal bonds between lord and followers cut across the conceptual unity of the territorial village (Hoadley 1975, pp.137-44 and 172-77), so that we may have to revise our whole assumption that the unchanging, introverted, solitary village was the basic unit of traditional Javanese society.

After 1830, things were never again to be the same. The more or less constant coming and going between region and court (whether of peaceful or violent traffic) suddenly fell away: no more Panaraga men fought in dynastic struggles, no more military and other officers received reward for their services in the form of grants in a particular area (perhaps their own), no more royal benefactions were conferred on perdikan desa such as Tegalsari. And it was the end of the old barefoot bupati: the colonial administration was determined to reduce their numbers (a good start was made by dismissing the 'politically unreliable' and absorbing their jurisdictions among those of the remaining bupati) and at the same time to distinguish them more sharply from the general rural populace. The rough and ready samurai must transform himself into an impassive mandarin. It seems the old Panaraga aristocracy were not pleased, for many of their graves are reputed to carry a curse (waler) upon any 'office-holder' (that is, colonial bupati and their subordinates) who dared come there (Adam 1938, 1939; Purwanelana 1866, p.59). Perhaps they knew that most of their descendants would live in poverty, though not without popular distinction.

Despite the very real changes which were introduced, the old ties were not entirely broken, or not at once. Tegalsari, for instance, continued to be a prestigious institution: one of its kyai had a following at the court of Yogyakarta during the 1880s (Kumar, forthcoming) and the last of the pujangga (court literati), the well-known Surakarta poet Ranggawarsita, was educated at the Tegalsari pesantren (Ongkoham 1975, p.4). Other links of a more curious nature remained. The forested area of Lodaya had for a long period been used as a place of exile for those whose presence at the Surakarta court had become troublesome to the ruler, and this population appears to have maintained a lively interest in any subversive movement directed against the establishment in their old home.15

PEACE AND SYSTEMIZATION

'Where the ruler is at the same time a merchant, compulsion knows no bounds' (P.J. Merkus, quoted in Furnivall 1939, p.116).
Though we know that there were no major wars after 1830, the colonial government was less assured of the continuance of peace and maintained an elaborate police and spy network designed to pick up potential trouble-makers early in their careers. Yet it was committed not only to maintaining order but also to making the colony pay, and, like the Javanese rulers of earlier times, relied largely on the productive and constructive powers of the Javanese peasantry. Unlike the Javanese rulers, however, the colonial government was not concerned merely to draw off a proportion of the rice grown by its subjects, but to produce and deliver a rather wide range of export crops, and to do this with a good deal more regularity and accountancy. In construction work too, the peasantry was required to undertake more ambitious projects, though not always by technologically more expeditious methods. The constant colonial demand for more peasant labour revealed, *inter alia*, by the continuous canvassing of the *arbeidvraagstuk* (labour question) which runs through nineteenth century official documents, should be seen against the demographic pattern of the early nineteenth century. In its second decade Raffles wrote: 'Over far the greater part, seven-eighths of the island, the soil is either neglected or badly cultivated and the population scanty. It is by the produce of the remaining eighth that the whole of the nation is supported; ...' and 'Many of the best spots still remain uncultivated, and several districts are almost deserts and neglected, which might be the seats of a crowded and happy peasantry,' (Raffles 1817, p.108 and p.69). Even allowing for a generous margin of error in Raffles' estimates, we must still accept a very different picture of the Javanese countryside than the one which had developed by the close of the century.

The colonial organization of peasant labour after 1830 was organized under the rubric of the Cultivation System. Its essence was simply that the cultivators, instead of paying a land-rent or tax, would pay their dues to the government by devoting a percentage of their land and time to growing an export crop. Apart from growing this crop, however, they had much else to do. There were three main headings of compulsory labour service: compulsory services for native officials (the so-called *pantjendiensten*); compulsory labour on public works (*heerendiensten*); and labour on behalf of the village's own needs (*desadiensten*). Though according to official regulations there was a limit to the amount of time a peasant could be required to set aside for these services, the vested interests of the different beneficiaries of his labour meant that he might actually find himself called upon to labour for the better part of the year. This left little time to grow the crop which actually fed the population, rice; and in some areas serious famines developed, beginning with the Cirebon region in the early 1840s.

What changes did the demands of the System make on local social and economic structures? Once again, the available evidence is defective and regional variation makes generalization hazardous, but from what research has been done certain developments seem significant. In Panaraga, for instance, there are indications of a change in the distribution of land. There appear to have been two types of landholding arrangement within the village. There was land which had been cleared by the original settlers - the 'elite' group of rural society, usually referred to under the name *oakal bakal* - to which their descendants had a hereditary right. But there
was also land which was held by the village itself, and which was periodically redistributed among its inhabitants - not only the *okal group, but also other long-term residents. Under the Javanese rulers, these landholding villagers were obliged to surrender a certain proportion of their rice crop as tax, and were also subject to labour service (corvée). In addition, however, to the landholding villagers there was also a class of villagers who held no land, usually designated *num pang (lodgers). And since many of those with hereditary rights to land had good deal more acreage than they could cultivate with only family labour, the landless *num pang became a dependent labour force living and working on the land of wealthier villagers. They were not liable to any labour service for the ruler. Some Dutch officials saw the *num pang as a disreputable, lawless population who led an itinerant life and were always ready to pack up with a leader who inspired them with the feats of heroic figures of former days (Louw 1894, p.26).

Faced with enormous demands for labour in the period of the Cultivation System and with this commodity in short supply, it was necessary for the village to shift as many of its inhabitants as possible into a category liable to labour service, in order to spread the burden. This was done by re-classifying land which had once been hereditary in individual family as communal, village land, in which category it could be divided up among more people: the *num pang, in particular, were given land (Onghokham, pp.167-88). This had two effects: it broke up large landholdings into smaller parcels; and it tended to fix the *num pang to the soil of their particular village where they were allotted land, ending their semi-nomadic way of life.

Research on developments in some areas suggests that this initial sharing-out of village lands among a larger number of people in the early years of the Cultivation System was followed by the emergence at a later period of a group of (in Javanese terms) large landholders, who were to make use of a relatively advantageous position to enrich themselves while the mass of lesser landholders lost ground (Elson 1978, pp.25-26). It is not possible to say yet to what extent this was a Java-wide phenomenon.

Under the Cultivation System, government directives rested not upon the individual but upon the village, and this had important consequences for its future development. During this period and indeed throughout the century the desire for as much administrative efficiency as could be achieved cheaply led to a gradual shaping of the Javanese village into a better-defined entity than it had ever been. Boundaries were more sharply drawn; regulations were enacted requiring official sanction for the subdivision or amalgamation of villages; and even when some colonial administrators began to feel that policy towards the Javanese village should be drawn in the interests of the village itself rather than in those of the government, the ideal was still a parochial community, a self-governing territorial demarcated *gemeente (van den Berg 1901, passim). The position of village headman too became a formalized, entrenched institution, and the individual concerned had reason to be increasingly sensitive to the wishes of those above him in the hierarchy. In the early decades of the Cultivation System the government had frequently departed from its principle of non-interference in village affairs when it came to the choice of a headman, in 1854 the right to elect its own head was guaranteed to every village...
under direct rule (van den Berg 1901, pp.12, 31, 45). Even then, however, 
an election could be declared invalid if the village's choice was 'unsuitable', 
and village heads could still be censured, incarcerated, and dismissed on 
higher authority. If he were co-operative, however, the village head was, 
obviously the prime example of those mentioned above who were able to profit 
from a 'relatively advantageous position'; and later, when private enterprise 
became dominant, village heads were insidiously wooed by European and 
Chinese entrepreneurs, and found themselves receiving suitable 'presents' 
when satisfactory agreements were concluded with their village.

Yet, though the standardization and fixity brought about at this time 
were real enough, it would be wrong to depict all Javanese villages as the 
same, or the entire rural population as now fixed to a small plot of soil. 
Apart from variations in physical form - the Sundanese village with its 
pile houses in scattered hamlets, the central Javanese village with its 
single large complex of houses - there were also variations in legal and 
administrative status. There was still a limited area of central Java under 
the direct rule of the Javanese principalities (a 'rule' which was however 
exercised under the ever-watchful eye of colonial officialdom, always 
fearful of the recurrence of a significant revolt). Here the system of 
royal land grants to officials and dependants was maintained well into the 
twentieth century: and with a burgeoning aristocracy having to make do 
with straitened resources in land, further fragmentation of apanages was 
inevitable. It had been the custom for an official who received apanage 
lands to appoint an agent (the bekel) to exercise authority over the 
village population, and for the bekel to offer a gift of homage (the bekti) 
to the apanage-holder at the time he was invested with his appointment. With 
the necessity for apanage-holders to obtain the same financial advantage 
from ever-decreasing parcels of land, however, this old custom was trans-
formed so that the bekel-ship was in fact sold to the highest bidder, who 
had, in turn, to recover the price he had paid from the population under 
him. As the century wore on, the subjects of the principalities (the so-
called Vorstenlanden) were remarked for their poverty; and the aristocracy 
either for moral decadence or for the development of a neo-traditional 
culture which offered little in the way of social or intellectual renovation.

Another group of peasants who were subject to the authority of their 
immediate overlords in a manner we might well describe as feudal, were those 
living on the so-called 'private lands', that is, sometimes very large 
tracts of land which had been alienated by the colonial government at one 
time or another, to private individuals. Here, as in the Vorstenlanden, 
the limited degree of community self-regulation which was allowed to villages 
under direct rule did not exist, and officials and police were appointed, 
and taxes and services levied, irrespective of the wishes of the population 
or of overall colonial policy. Despite a government policy to 
repurchase these estates, many remained intact until the end of the colonial 
period.

One type of village which did retain a greater degree of autonomy, and 
enjoyed special legal status, was the perdikan desa, a class of villages 
which had previously enjoyed royal grants exempting them from taxation and 
service because of their religious functions, and which had been confirmed 
in this privileged status by the colonial government. There were about
one hundred and fifty such villages on Java in 1912 (Bijblad 1913, No. 7847). The heads of these villages were not elected but appointed by the *bupati*, who was supposed to choose the most suitable member of the family in which this office had been hereditary - always a family of special status and descent, not infrequently going back to one of the *wali*.20 These heads often had exceptionally large landholdings.21 The *perdikan* villages apparently had their own distinctive cultural atmosphere: in some of them popular Javanese entertainments such as the shadow theatre and the gamelan orchestra were disallowed in favour of more 'Arab' music and recitation, and a general pall of 'hypocritical piety often combined with low standards of morality' (van den Berg 1901, p.140) was said to hang over them, at least by colonial officials, who tended to view the *perdikan* desa as an unnecessary hole in the revenue net.

**ITINERANTS**

As has already been said, it would be wrong to depict all rural Javanese as fixed to a particular village, plot, or estate by the end of the nineteenth, or indeed by the first part of the twentieth century. Some groups of Javanese had occasion to travel widely. Firstly, there were the troops of players who specialized in one or the other of the performing arts in which Javanese society has always been so rich, and for which rural villagers have been prepared to pay not a small price.22 The wayang troups mentioned above are a notable example, but there were others, and at the 'upper' end of the performing spectrum practitioners of the wayang (shadow-puppet) theatre played to both court and village audiences, though its scenarios are set in an aristocratic and not a peasant milieu. Wayang seems to have exercised an almost mystical fascination for some villagers, who might travel to quite distant centres and at considerable financial cost to study under famous dalang (masters of wayang) to acquire the difficult theatrical and musical skills, and the language, so far removed from that used in everyday life. One writer has seen wayang theatre as a vehicle producing political and cultural identification with the Javanese state (Onghokhan 1975, pp.3-4); but it also contains an element of humour and satire which holds up its aristocratic heroes as less than wise and brave - an element which, if emphasized, could give a rather less 'royalist' tone to the whole.

The second major constituent group of the itinerant population were the travelling *santri*, the 'students of religion'. There were two reasons for the peripatetic character of much of Java's religious life. The first was the old-established custom of pilgrimage (*ziarah* or *suwara*), from the Arabic term for a pilgrimage to a place other than Mecca) to the sites of holy graves, especially those of the *wali*. Although these graves might be visited at any time (especially when a favour, such as a child, or success in one's occupation or other affairs, needed to be asked) there was usually a fixed time when the most famous graves were to be visited, leading to the development of a sort of pilgrimage circuit and to the assembling of large crowds at a particular site, so that Dutch officials complained about 'quasi-Masonic fraternities' in which the stronger encouraged weaker reeds to 'fanaticism' and even to active resistance.
On this pilgrimage circuit, members of the most prominent of Java's Islamic families - those from the perātikan desa and those with other claims to distinction - renewed their ties with one another, ties which were bound up with an intricate genealogical network created by marriage alliances over many generations. The second reason for which santri travelled was to further their education. It was traditionally believed that a serious student of religion could not consider himself fully educated if he had studied at only one pesantren, but must visit a number of pesantren in order to acquire the 'specialisms' of different kyai in the various Islamic sciences. There was a particular tradition of west Javanese, Sundanese-speaking, students travelling to east Javanese pesantren to study, for which they first needed to master Javanese.

Not all santri were serious students of religion, however, and it seems evident that, just as entering a university is not necessarily an indication of a scholastically-minded temperament, embracing the life of a travelling santri was also often done for reasons of congeniality not too much connected with thoughts of the divine or the after-life. There was not always a sharp distinction between travelling santri and other itinerant groups, and some Javanese texts depict santri as taking part in such activities as the highly erotic gamblikan dancing, and even having affairs with boy dancers, though this type of behaviour is never attributed to the greatest men of religion, who conduct themselves in a much more ascetic fashion. The warok dancers themselves claim descent from the disciples of Ki Ageng Mirah, who first converted Panaraga to Islam, and travesty, acrobatics, and conjuring were all popular in the old santri community. It would be equally wrong, however, to see santri cultivation of theatrical and musical genres as merely frivolous self-indulgence: in some areas musical performances of a religious nature which were of foreign, middle-eastern origin, such as the slawatan, were introduced by santri to become popular also among the less devout, leading to the development of something of a popular theatre and in this way the cultural repertoire of rural Java was enlarged to include genres which celebrated more Islamic values.

This rich and complex lode in Java's culture was not, alas, unaffected by overall developments in the colonial period. Firstly, as the rural population became impoverished, it was increasingly hard to support an itinerant population, and competition among kyai for popular support was sometimes intense and bitter. Secondly, men of deep religious commitment and what is nowadays described as outstanding leadership potential were precisely those who were most suspet to the colonial government, particularly when they moved from place to place and seemed to be building up a following in more than one locality, or when they seemed to be establishing the sort of relationship with members of the Javanese aristocracy which had given rise to such a difficult alliance to defeat in the Java War. For this reason, religious leaders were exiled (to non-Muslim areas) for even slighter reasons than Javanese princes, and the natural development of movements within the Islamic community was severely handicapped. Furthermore, colonial restrictions on travelling (such as the introduction of the reis pas), made movement between regions more difficult.

Lastly, there was still a considerable amount of migration of ordinary peasants from one area of Java to another. Movement out of indigo-growing
areas was common (indigo was probably the most unpopular of all crops, on account of its exceedingly tedious and onerous demands on the cultivator) as was migration of peasants from central Java to areas further east, such as Kediri, which only 'filled up' during the nineteenth century, or the extreme east of Java, depopulated by the wars of the late eighteenth century, where in-migrants made up a large proportion of the population even as late as the census of 1930.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF PEASANT SOCIETY IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: TWO EXAMPLES

A Changing Frame of Reference

Raffles had been concerned to see some improvement in the apparently slow rate of population increase on Java, a rate his calculations estimated to be very much slower than that of the English, and even below that of the French (Raffles 1817, p.76). By the end of the century this concern seems otiose, for the population had actually grown very much faster than Raffles was able to foresee. Land was therefore no longer as plentiful in relation to population as it had once been, a situation which produced further fragmentation of landholdings. Once again, however, it has to be said that regional variation was wide: some districts in Pasuruan regency apparently had virtually no more land available as sawah as early as the 1830s, whereas in parts of west Java serious fragmentation of landholdings does not seem to have occurred before the twentieth century (Elson 1978, p.12; Horikoshi 1976, p.110 ff). Though, as we have seen, migration to other parts of Java continued, it is nevertheless possible that a larger proportion of those who held land entrenched themselves in a particular village as land became progressively less easy to obtain over the island: certainly, it is a question which requires further investigation.

A second major trend over the last decades of the century greatly affected peasant life. This was the gradual phasing-out of the statist Cultivation System in favour of private entrepreneurs anxious to enter the apparently rich field of the Indies, which had contributed so much to the home country's domestic budget. After 1870, these entrepreneurs were permitted to hire peasant land on a hitherto unprecedented scale; it might be said that the peasant now had the worst of both worlds. He had increasingly to contend with the intrusion of a money economy and with the operation of powerful economic interests susceptible neither to social nor, on the whole, to serious governmental control; yet he himself was much more slowly freed from the social and governmental compulsion of the old days. It seems to the present writer that the peasant producer's obvious difficulties in holding his own or responding to the challenge of a modern economy, later to be attributed by colonial economists to the structural 'duality' of the economy itself, cannot really be explained without at least some reference to the 'duality' of the political and legal apparatus. A villager could not, for instance, usually buy off labour services even if it were economically advantageous: the pantjerdiensten (services for native office-holders) were abolished in 1882 but the heerendiensten (services for the state) not until 1902, and even after that date the desadiensten (services for the village) were still obligatory. Plantation managements
worked through village heads to the detriment of free choice, and the position of the plantations was strengthened by the fact that labour was no longer a commodity in short supply, so that many peasants now actively solicited work. The whole question of the costs and benefits of the plantation economy is a complex one, and we must await a full accounting from those qualified to provide it. It is clear, for instance, that the irrigation provided for sugar also increased productivity in peasant rice-growing, but equally clear that the terms of the contract with the plantations were a prime focus of peasant grievances, as the outbreaks of cane-burning demonstrate (Elson 1979). Once again, the terms of the contract reflect the political as much as the economic strength of the plantations, as does their reaction to the world-wide depression of the 1890s, which entailed simply paying less in land-rent and in wages. By this time, the returns that could be achieved by the manpower thus turned back into the traditional food-crop sector were not sufficient to compensate for what was lost in wages from the plantations, and the 1880s saw a seriously worsened food situation, and a higher incidence of localized revolt. In the polite phraseology of official reports, the last decades of the century were times of 'diminished welfare' on Java.

A Comparison

For a large part of the nineteenth century, the Javanese peasantry had shared many material and psychological characteristics with their European counterparts, although, if descriptions of European peasant life are at all accurate, one might add that Javanese peasant life was arguably a good deal less squalid. In the late nineteenth century, however, the peasantry in a number of European countries underwent a series of related transformations no less far-reaching because we children of a later age do not readily apprehend how very different things once were. In France, for example, the peasantry had been characterized, for the major part of the century, by poverty and conservatism, and by a degree of isolation which made them see as 'foreigners' those whom we would describe as their fellow Frenchmen living as little as ten or fifteen miles away, and conceive of the 'national' government only as 'le douane et le fisc'. By the end of the century, however, they were much less poor, much less conservative in their economic attitudes and much less 'localocentric', to recall Wolf's term, in their political attitudes; and this radical transformation would continue in the first part of the twentieth century. Let us briefly review the instrumentalities of this process, which made the French peasant, materially and psychologically, a member of a wider community, not a provincial, but a 'citizen' of the nation state. They were: increasing urbanization, which involved both the diversification of upper-class urban society, providing rural people with a wider range of choice in the allocation of their political support, and an increased transmission of innovative urban ideas to rural areas; military service, and the breakdown of regional and local loyalties which it brought about; a great expansion of the education system, which was strongly concerned to improve the oral and written use of the 'mother tongue' and to inculcate the idea of the fatherland and of civic duty; and, not least, economic developments in a period when an expanding and diversifying economy provided new opportunities to those who could acquire new skills, and demonstrated the advantage to be gained by
thinking in terms of a wider, national format rather than of a local one.

Taking them in order, it is clear enough why these instrumentalties did not operate on Java. Such urban development with an economic rationale as had existed prior to the Dutch economic presence had been stultified by that presence, and the nineteenth century did not see a significant development of a native urban society. To the extent that an economically diversified, urban middle class existed, this was predominantly Chinese, and therefore could not provide political leadership to other levels of society. The Javanese 'upper class' did not become more diverse - the lansat remained very much the predominant type of the wealthy and influential Javanese - nor more urban, and had neither reason nor opportunity to court political support among the peasantry. When in the following century something of an urban elite semi-independent of the colonial bureaucracy did develop, it was to be an elite whose intellectual aspirations to leadership were not supported by independent economic resources, and whose ability to attach to itself a peasant following was severely restricted both by the lack of those resources and, of course, by the unfree political climate of a colonized polity.

Military service had been, as I hope this paper has demonstrated, a powerful agency by which peasants had been made aware of developments in the larger polity: I say this, of course, without suggesting that either in Java or in France the experience was a pleasant one, or that wars are desirable because they develop national unity. After 1830, Javanese peasants were no longer recruited to fight for their kings, or would-be kings; and a colonial army could not propagate the necessity of loyalty to the patrie, as the French army did. A similar reversion of previous developments took place in the educational field. It is arguable, I think, that the pesantren network provided, in spite of imperfections, a curriculum which though not strictly 'national' was attuned to the inculcation of a Javanese language and of a Javanese culture and religion. With the loss of royal patronage and the role of the royal court as the real and functioning cultural centre of the kingdom, the pesantren seem to have been increasingly confined to a purely local ambience. The colonial education system which was - very slowly and partially - to provide a supra-local format of educational reference could not, though it unintentionally developed a sense of common interest and common grievances, provide a coherent sense of identity and commonly-held values. This deficiency was to become disturbing to some of its twentieth century graduates, and to lead them to establish more 'national' systems by their own efforts and often at the cost of incurring considerable official displeasure.

Finally, the presence of an 'expanding capitalist economy' meant very different things to the French and to the Javanese peasant. In Java, the peasant made contact with this economy at a period at which the dominance of foreign interests was long entrenched, and when his own resources and consequent ability to maintain his position vis-a-vis the operation of these powerful interests had been significantly eroded; and, as we have seen, a one-sided compulsion remained present in many ways long after the official 'freeing' of the economy. In France, rural populations were able to benefit by the competition for labour among the different sectors of
a diversifying economy: the emigration of workers following job opportunities pushed up wages in the areas from which they emigrated, in which labour was now at a premium. On Java, the economy was not diversifying to anything like the same extent, remaining as it did almost exclusively concerned with the cultivation of food and export crops; nor was there significant competition for labour, due not only to its ready availability but also to pressure from powerful plantation interests on the colonial government to abort any trends which seemed likely to raise the price of their labour. Though a Javanese peasant might migrate in a geographical sense - even, of course, outside Java, where significant numbers of his countrymen worked as contract coolies on plantations such as those of north Sumatra - for some material advantage, there was little opportunity for him to acquire modern skills, and he was always in a relatively weaker bargaining position than his French counterpart. In general it can be said that the modern economy seized upon the Javanese peasant; he could not, unlike his European counterparts, seize upon the modern economy as a means of transforming and bettering himself.

Addressing the question as to why conservatism and resistance to change prevailed for so long in France and new ways, though known, were not adopted, Weber writes:

... we can see now that their narrow vision was the vision of frightened men in desperate circumstances; that the village was a lifeboat striving to keep afloat in heavy seas, its culture a combination of discipline and reassurance designed to keep its occupants alive. Insecurity was the rule, existence consistently marginal. Tradition, routine, vigorous adherence to the family and the community - and to their rules - alone made existence possible...

Since all had to pull together, no deviance could be tolerated (Weber 1976, p.479). On Java, this factor operated more strongly, and not less so as in France, as the nineteenth century drew to a close; and Wolf's article convincingly describes the economic factors underlying the defensive reaction of closing in, of demanding loyalty to the community rather than to exterior ideas or parties, which he found in his case study. This article has attempted, however sketchily, to outline the economic developments and administrative measures of the nineteenth century which are essential to the understanding of the Javanese village in later times: the new precision of its legal definition and status; the fixing of labour within its boundaries, as exemplified by the fate of the rampon of Panaraga; the grip on the village headman of a much more firmly-established ruling apparatus; the likely effects of population increase - all made of the village a more tightly-bound and precisely delimited community than it had been before these developments. It has also been suggested that other less obvious developments were of equal significance for the fate of the Javanese village, that the destruction of the old cultural and political context, and its replacement by a colonial state alien by culture and sterile by policy, made of the village the only society of which its inhabitants could be members. Where the French village was integrated into the nation-state, the Javanese, in all its newly tight definition, was merely encapsulated; and, in the twentieth century, its inhabitants would have a far, far wider gulf to bridge before they too might become 'citizens'.
The author would like to acknowledge the very generous help of Dr W.J. O'Malley, who has been of great assistance in the revision of a first draft of this article. Since, however, his advice has not always been followed precisely, he is in no way responsible for any remaining errors of fact or of interpretation.

1 One of the earliest officials to take on the task wrote that he was confronted with a situation where 'no district here in Java, no, not even any village, is run on the same lines as another, for everything among the Javanese is based on adat or customs' (Governor P.G. van Overstraten, writing in 1796, quoted in de Jonge 1884, p.408. Van Overstraten apparently never completed his study).

2 The wali (saints or friends of God) were the first apostles and establishers of Islam on Java. Traditional accounts usually list nine of them, though the personalia are not always the same.

3 Under the Mataram dynasty, the Madiun-Panaraga region had been the apanag area of the prince who bore the title Pangeran Purbaya, and who was the most prominent of the ruler's brothers. There was apparently a tradition of intermarriage between the Purbayas and the Kajoran line, whose patriarch was so important in the rebellion of the 1670s; and the Kajorans were related also to the Batara Katong line. On this network of genealogical ties, see Ongkokham 1975, pp.35-36.

4 The dikir is a repetitive litany, e.g. of the name of God (Allah or another referant), sometimes involving ecstasy-inducing techniques.

5 On the foundation charters of Tegalsari see Fokkens 1877, p.318 ff.

6 It is arguable that the separate development of coast and inland dates from the Dutch acquisition of the pastiir from Mataram in the late seventeenth century, an acquisition which many later Javanese rulers wished to see reversed.

7 See map in de Jonge 1884, p.256, showing the clustering of settlements around major rivers.

8 For as much as it is worth, Panaraga was one of the major road junctions, with roads to Pajang (via Kadiuwang), Japan, Rawa (Tulung Agung) and Kedil (Schrieke 1957, p.110).

9 An excellent description of present-day reyog is found in Kartomi (1976).

10 On the extreme east of Java, see Kumar 1979. In north-east Java, the Madurese influx seems to have led to the establishment of separate Madurese and Javanese territorial communities, with those bupati with Madurese connections encouraging immigration into their kabupaten: see e.g. Bosch 1932.
The two major principalities into which the kingdom of Mataram was divided (Surakarta and Yogyakarta) had later to provide some of their lands for the support of two considerably smaller principalities, the Mangkunegaran (created in 1757) and the Pakualaman (1812). Since rather large slices of territory had had to be ceded to the Dutch, the total area of land available had been reduced.

See Kumar 1980, p.29 on the granting to Mangkunegaran army officers of parcels of land which were of a size to provide a very good living indeed.

Once again, however, it should be stressed that, because of the strong links between local and central elites, not all grants made on 'central' initiative were necessarily against local interests. When Pakubuwana IV's niece married one of the kyai of Tegalsari, her uncle made her a grant of pangrembe land which no doubt enriched Tegalsari (see [Louw and] de Klerk 1909, p.172); and it is possible that some of the military officers who received grants were in fact local lords. Finally, some land was not effectively controlled either by central or by local authorities; see, for instance, the account in Soeradipoera et al 1915, Cantos 239-61, of one of the 'robber villages' which were a feature of the Javanese landscape even in times of peace.

When Panaraga was brought under direct rule, the bupati were instructed that they might no longer go barefoot in public, as they had been accustomed to do, but should wear kasoed ([Louw and] de Klerk 1909, p.182), which they can be seen wearing in nineteenth century photographs. At the same time, they were issued with payung (tall parasols) like those used by the coastal bupati, to impress the population. It is said that they were pleased.

See e.g. the official note in Mailrapport 1888, No. 597.

Van Niel (1972, p. 91) makes the point that the Cultivation System was actually not a system but a number of differing local arrangements. This is true, but there is no doubt that in relation to the regulation of agriculture before direct rule it represents a much more systematic approach.

The most usual proportion seems to have been fifty per cent (out of which local officials drew a certain proportion before the remainder was sent to the ruler).

Once again, it has to be said that regional variation had been very great, and in some areas all households, not only those holding land, were liable to labour service.

There were other categories of villager, again classified according to their relationship to land, i.e. those who owned house plus yard and those who owned house alone. They too had no responsibilities to the state. As might be expected, terminology and classification of village groups varies from place to place.
It seems, however, that some of the colonial bupati may have used their power of appointment to advance their own relatives at the expense of the family to which the office had traditionally belonged, thus reducing the influence of these old families.

One report gives an average of seventy times more than ordinary villagers for some perdikan villages in Banyumas (Hasselman 1887-88, p.98).

Many villages freed dalang, gamelan players and dancers (and also village artisans, such as carpenters) from the burden of tax and labour services (van den Berg 1901, p.104f.)

See in particular the Serat Cabolang and Serat Centini, summarized in Pigeaud 1933, passim.

The slawatan became very popular in east Java, and in Bagelen and Kedu 'Arab-style' performances of religious music were popular outside religiously pious circles (Pigeaud 1938, pp.246-78).

Another question which is related to the apparent failure of the growth of a 'modern' economy to stimulate and dynamize the traditional sector is that of landholding. Though the general trend still is not clear, it seems that the transition from communally-held to individually-held land was slower than one might expect in an economy developing in the direction of monetized and capitalist forms. It appears that the plantations actually found it more convenient to continue to deal with communally-held land en bloc, rather than with individual landowners who might have too keen an eye on the economic potential of their own plot of land (see Wertheim 1964, p.140; Furnivall 1939, pp.178-79, 319).

Compare the description of almost unrelieved poverty, isolation, brutality and ignorance given in Weber (1976) with that of the material life of Javanese peasants in Mayer (1897) which represents some peasants (particularly of course village chiefs) as living in pleasant, well appointed houses far different to many European hovels. This comparison relies, of course, largely on the subjective judgment of these authors.

Why France, it may be asked. Though other comparisons may be equally illuminating, I have chosen this one on the grounds that French rural society was for long characterized by many of the features - pronounced regional and linguistic variation, a tradition of strong local leadership and weak centralizing government, for example - which we observe in Java. Some may feel that a comparison with another Asian society which was modernized in the nineteenth century would be more appropriate; but the clearest example in this category is Japan, where it seems indisputable that even at a much earlier period the village had been incorporated into a relatively centralized system to a far greater degree. We have village records, kept by villagers at central direction, going back to the seventeenth century, a situation inconceivable in Java (and in France, where records of village developments before 1789 were kept either by the the church or by the seigneurie).
This at least is the picture one gains from Weber (1976), whose description of the French peasantry is of a collection of individuals or at most villages without common organization, solidarity, or consciousness — comprising a class, in Marx's famous simile, only as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes (p. 245).

Which was in fact not the mother tongue of up to one-fifth of the French population at mid-century (see Weber 1976, p. 310).

This is perhaps a matter of controversy, but in the opinion of the present writer it is highly questionable to see the peasantry as inculcating a well-defined and exclusively 'Islamic' curriculum conceptually distinguished from 'Javanese' cultural attainments.

Compare, for instance, the very different impressions of the world of the ulama we obtain from Soehardi (1975), dealing with an eighteenth century text, and Horikoshi (1976), dealing with the twentieth century.

The best-known of such movements is the Taman Siswa school system founded by one of the earliest Javanese nationalists.

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